Category: Documents de Travail

Le diable est-il dans l’annexe ? Les risques budgétaires des PPP saisis par le traitement des passifs éventuels

Numéro: 2016-2

Frédéric MARTY – Le diable est-il dans l’annexe ? Les risques budgétaires des PPP saisis par le traitement des passifs éventuels

Résumé : Les contrats publics globaux à long terme, dont les PPP, ont été vivement critiqués par la Cour des comptes, et par le rapport d’information des sénateurs Portelli et Sueur, sur la base des risques budgétaires qui leur sont associés. Cette contribution porte sur un des facteurs de risque induits par les montages financiers des PPP, à savoir les clauses de garanties que peut accorder l’autorité publique pour faciliter leur bouclage ou réduire leurs coûts.

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Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?

Numéro: 2016-1

Marco BUSO, Frederic MARTY, and Phuong Tra TRAN – Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?

Résumé : The use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to realize and operate public infrastructures is often associated with fiscal circumventing motivations.Using data at the municipal level, this paper investigates whether budget-constrained public authorities adopt PPPs in order to hide public debts. The results show that financial di culties often lead to a preference for PPPs instead of traditional forms of public procure- ment. However, this behavior is not explained by the possibility of debt hiding. We then discuss alternative explanations for these findings.

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Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Numéro: 2015-6

Laure ATHIAS and Stéphane SAUSSIERAre Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Abstract : Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is
exogenous.Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Contractual Choices and Technical Efficiency in Public Procurement: The Case of Regional Railway Transport in France

Numéro: 2015-5

Miguel Amaral and Jean-Christophe Thiebaud – Contractual Choices and Technical Efficiency in Public Procurement: The Case of Regional Railway Transport in France

Abstract: This paper contributes to the analysis of the impact of contractual design on the performance in public procurement. It focuses on the case of railway regional transport in France, where the regions were given the prerogatives of transport organising authorities in 2002.

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Vertical Separation in Rail Transport: How do Prices Influence Coordination?

Numéro: 2015-4

Miguel Amaral and Jean-Christophe Thiebaud – Vertical Separation in Rail Transport: How do Prices Influence Coordination?

Abstract: This paper contributes to the debates over the relative performance of governance modes in network industries. The issues of vertical separation and integration in network industries have been extensively studied from several perspectives including competition eff ect, production cost synergies or coordination costs.

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The Quality of Governance and the Use of Negotiated Procurement Procedures: Evidence from the European Union

Numéro: 2015-3

Eshien Chong, Michael Klien and Stéphane SaussierThe Quality of Governance and the Use of Negotiated Procurement Procedures: Evidence from the European Union

Abstract: A key phase in any public-private contracting setting involves the selection of a private contracting partner. Although open competitive tenders (open auctions) are usually the preferred mechanism, recent developments in the academic literature have pointed out that alternatives mechanisms, such as restricted competitive tenders or negotiations, may in fact be a better way to select a private contractor when the contract to be awarded is difficult to specify (Goldberg, 1977; Kelman, 2005; Bajari et al., 2009).

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Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Numéro: 2015-2

Jean Beuve, Marian Moszoro and Stéphane SaussierPolitical Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Abstract: We compare procurement contracts where the procurer is either a public agent or a private corporation. Using algorithmic data reading and textual analysis on a rich dataset of contracts for a standardized product and service from a single provider, we find that public contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and their renegotiation is formalized more frequently in amendments.

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The Permeability of Public Contracts: Evidence from Renegotiations in the French Car Park Sector

Numéro: 2015-1

Zoé Le Squeren and John Moore – The Permeability of Public Contracts: Evidence from Renegotiations in the French Car Park Sector

Abstract: Recent research suggests that public and private agreements are inherently different. Public contracts should indeed be more permeable to the external (and, more specifically, the political) environment. This paper studies empirically the intrinsic differences between these two types of contracting.

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Water LPEs in Cities: Three Case Studies

Numéro: 2014-13

Marianne Audette-Chapdelaine, Michael Klien et Maria SalvettiWater LPEs in Cities: Three Case Studies

Abstract: The failure or success of providing public services like drinking water through different institutional arrangements may depend crucially and in a non-trivial way from the administrative capacity. A strand of literature deals with this question and what administrative capacities are required for governments to adapt to these situations (Brown and Potoski (2003)). Initially, pre-existing administrative capacities will impact on the decision to organize a public service through direct public management or otherwise. In addition, administrative capacities developed through the provision process, once the governance structure is decided, will also impact on the service performance and at the end, on the willingness to switch from one governance structure to another. The objective of the three case studies, looking carefully at three cities (Stuttgart – Germany, Montréal – Canada, and Brest – France), is to highlight key features of such relationships between administrative capacity and choices made by cities to organize their water public services.