Category: Documents de Travail

Local Public Enterprises: A Taxonomy

Numéro: 2014-12

Stéphane Saussier et Michael KlienLocal Public Enterprises: A Taxonomy

Abstract: Local public enterprises (LPE) represent a popular mode of public service delivery in OECD countries. In Europe, where the use of LPEs is particularly pronounced, local governments use not only public enterprises integrated into the administration but also 16,000 legally independent organizations, which they own at least partially. The use of LPEs varies, however, greatly between countries and is largely determined by the allocation of public service delivery between public and private sector as well as the functional decentralization in federal systems. In this report, we develop a comprehensive taxonomy of LPEs along three criteria: directly managed LPEs, corporatized LPEs and mixed (intermunicipal and public private) LPEs.

This work has been coordinated by Claire Charbit.

Elections and project delivery in public work procurement: A red ribbon effect?

Numéro: 2014-11

Eshien Chong, Michael Klien et John MooreElections and project delivery in public work procurement: A red ribbon effect? 

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the electoral cycle empirically using data on public work procurement in 1,634 French municipalities between 2005 and 2007. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we compare public work procurement of municipalities whose mayor was a candidate in the 2007 legislative elections with those of municipalities whose mayor did not run. We find that public work contracts are more likely to end in the years preceding the legislative election in municipalities whose mayor ran in the election. We interpret these observations as indications that electoral considerations influence the conduct of public procurement. In particular, our results suggest that mayors running for legislative elections in France attempted to enhance their election perspective by influencing the timing of project delivery in public work procurement. We consider several potential mechanisms to explain our results.

Procedural Rules and their Impact on Procurement Outcomes: Evidence from France

Numéro: 2014-10

Anissa Boulemia et John MooreProcedural Rules and their Impact on Procurement Outcomes: Evidence from France

Abstract: For the last 20 years, a series of public procurement reforms has sought to enhance the efficiency of purchases by increasing public buyers’ discretionary power. Yet it has been argued that there is a lack of empirical results concerning the impact of such reforms on outcomes, including efficiency. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by studying the use of the French “adapted procedure”, a tendering procedure that allows discretion to public buyers to adapt the procedure to their needs.

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La renégociation dans les PPPs : risques et opportunités

Numéro: 2014-9

Jean Beuve, Aude Le Lannier et Zoé Le SquerenLa renégociation dans les PPPs : risques et opportunités

Plan : Les PPPs présentent des spécificités qui font de leurs renégociations un sujet d’étude essentiel. Sources d’efficience par les nécessaires adaptations contractuelles qu’elles permettent ou au contraire d’inefficience de par leur nature opportuniste, les renégociations des contrats de PPPs recouvrent une réalité complexe. Ce chapitre décrit dans un premier temps les différents types de comportements opportunistes auxquels sont confrontés les PPPs.

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L’évolution des conditions de financement des contrats de PPP

Numéro: 2014-8

Frédéric Marty – L’évolution des conditions de financement des contrats de PPP

Plan : Notre propos dans ce chapitre est de retracer les évolutions dans les montages financiers utilisés dans les contrats de PPP depuis les vingt dernières années et de mettre en exergue leur sensibilité aux conditions d’accès aux marchés des fonds prêtables. Nous montrons d’abord que les PPP se sont initialement développés dans un contexte financier favorable lequel a permis de profiter de fonds abondants et peu coûteux.

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Les outils de régulation des partenariats public-privé

Numéro: 2014-7

Lisa Chever et Aude Le Lannier – Les outils de régulation des partenariats public-privé

Plan : Une première section de ce chapitre présentera les outils avancés, par la littérature théorique, pour sélectionner efficacement son partenaire. Ces mécanismes étant rarement suffisants pour garantir l’efficacité de la gestion du service sur toute la durée de vie du contrat, une deuxième section sera dédiée aux mécanismes de régulation ex post, une fois le contrat attribué.

Public Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment

Numéro: 2014-6

Antonio Estache et Stéphane SaussierPublic Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment

Abstract: Over the last 35 years or so, governements around the world have enhanced the participation of private actors to deliver a wide variety of goods and services, traditionally delivered by the public sector. The development of public-private partnerships (PPPs) has been, and continues to be, one of the most popular contractual forms this increased private sector role has taken.

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IPPP Risks and Opportunities: An Economic Perspective

Numéro: 2014-5

J. de Brux et F. Marty – IPPP Risks and Opportunities: An Economic Perspective

Abstract: This article analyzes some of the issues raised by institutionalized public-private partnerships in an economic perspective. We demonstrate that although they may address some of the main limits of purely contractual public-private partnerships, such as the issues of control, know-how transfer, or additional financial cost, they may induce some intrinsic risks, related to alterations of the contractual incentive structure and judicial challenges.

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Quality of Outsourced Services, Rent-Seeking and Contract Design. Evidence from Cleaning Contracts.

Numéro: 2014-4

Quality of Outsourced Services, Rent-Seeking and Contract Design. Evidence from Cleaning Contracts.

Jean Beuve and Lisa Chever

Abstract: This paper estimates the impact of contract design on the enforceability of quality in outsourced public contracts. Using a four-year panel data of 102 cleaning contracts, our findings suggest that quality enforcement highly depends on the ex ante contracting process.

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