Category: Working Papers

Public-private partnerships for infrastructure at the sub-national level of government: Opportunities and challenges in France

Numéro: 2017-2

Stéphane Saussier – Public-private partnerships for infrastructure at the sub-national level of government: Opportunities and challenges in France

Abstract : According to the OECD, after a short-lived expansion in reaction to the crisis, public investment has recently experienced a substantial decline in a number of European countries (OECD 2013).  As a natural reaction to these budget cuts, more efficient use of increasingly limited resources is put in the limelight: “Doing more with less” has become the mantra of this decade. Those financial constraints have been translated by a changing role of the government itself. Moving from own production to delegation and externalization, the public sector has shifted its focus from dealing with the internal bureaucracy to managing relations with external partners through public-private partnerships. As a result of this transition, which began before the financial crisis, the typical job description of public managers and bureaucrats has significantly changed over the last decades.

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Le contrat de PPP à l’épreuve des contentieux : Retours d’expériences sur le cas français

Numéro: 2017-1

Thierry Kirat and Frédéric Marty – Le contrat de PPP à l’épreuve des contentieux : Retours d’expériences sur le cas français

Abstract : Public-private partnerships are characterised by specific features (duration, complexity…) favouring disputes among the two partners and with third parties in both contracting in operating stages. Mostly based on the French experience of the contrats de partenariat, this paper first investigates the disputes between the public and private partners (renegotiations and early termination cases…) before considering in a second part the litigations initiated by unsuccessful candidates or other stakeholders opposed to the project. Our contribution finally tackles the issue of the contractual provisions introduced to deal with these legal risks and presents their potential consequences for the public partner.

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When does ideology matter? An empirical analysis of French municipalities’ make-or-buy choices

Numéro: 2016-5

Jean Beuve and Zoé Le Squeren – When does ideology matter? An empirical analysis of French municipalities’ make-or-buy choices

Abstract: Many empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local government decisions regarding the management of public services. In those studies, ideological motives are often found to be not, or at least very slightly, significant. This absence of ideological impact is often interpreted as a proof that local governments are more and more guided by pragmatic rather than ideological motivations, notably because contracting out has become less controversial.

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The law of small numbers: Investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

Numéro: 2016-4

Lisa Chever, Stéphane Saussier and Anne Yvrande-BillonThe law of small numbers: Investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

Abstract: A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU-member states to procure small contracts (OECD, 2010). In this paper, we investigate this paradox.

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Les obligations à impact social : une nouvelle génération de PPP pour les politiques sociales ?

Numéro: 2016-3

Frédéric MARTY – Les obligations à impact social : une nouvelle génération de PPP pour les politiques sociales ?

Abstract: Experimented in the United Kingdom and in the United States for several years, the Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) aims at benefiting from a private financing of some social programs while conditioning the debt reimbursement and the financial returns to the fulfilment of performance objectives.

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Le diable est-il dans l’annexe ? Les risques budgétaires des PPP saisis par le traitement des passifs éventuels

Numéro: 2016-2

Frédéric MARTY – Le diable est-il dans l’annexe ? Les risques budgétaires des PPP saisis par le traitement des passifs éventuels

Abstract: Several parliamentary and superior audit court reports have criticized the use of global public contracts on the basis of their potential consequences in terms of fiscal risks. Our contribution aims at stressing the importance of one of risk inducers, the guarantees granted to the private contractor in PPPs such as a minimum revenue clause or a guarantee on the debt reimbursement.

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Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?

Numéro: 2016-1

Marco BUSO, Frederic MARTY, and Phuong Tra TRAN – Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?

Abstract:The use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to realize and operate public infrastructures is often associated with fiscal circumventing motivations.Using data at the municipal level, this paper investigates whether budget-constrained public authorities adopt PPPs in order to hide public debts. The results show that financial di culties often lead to a preference for PPPs instead of traditional forms of public procure- ment. However, this behavior is not explained by the possibility of debt hiding. We then discuss alternative explanations for these findings.

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Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Numéro: 2015-6

Laure ATHIAS and Stéphane SAUSSIERAre Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Abstract : Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is
exogenous.Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Contractual Choices and Technical Efficiency in Public Procurement: The Case of Regional Railway Transport in France

Numéro: 2015-5

Miguel Amaral and Jean-Christophe Thiebaud – Contractual Choices and Technical Efficiency in Public Procurement: The Case of Regional Railway Transport in France

Abstract: This paper contributes to the analysis of the impact of contractual design on the performance in public procurement. It focuses on the case of railway regional transport in France, where the regions were given the prerogatives of transport organising authorities in 2002.

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Vertical Separation in Rail Transport: How do Prices Influence Coordination?

Numéro: 2015-4

Miguel Amaral and Jean-Christophe Thiebaud – Vertical Separation in Rail Transport: How do Prices Influence Coordination?

Abstract: This paper contributes to the debates over the relative performance of governance modes in network industries. The issues of vertical separation and integration in network industries have been extensively studied from several perspectives including competition eff ect, production cost synergies or coordination costs.

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