Documents de Travail

Achieving organizational identification and employee commitment through CSR communication

Numéro: 2017-5

Ouiam Kaddouri et Elisabeth AlbertiniAchieving organizational identification and employee commitment through CSR communication

Abstract : Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) communication is nowadays an important constituent of the dialogue between firms and their stakeholders. Nonetheless, there is still little guidance regarding its returns and impacts on both primary and secondary stakeholders. Through a single case study in a French firm in the gas industry, which is based on in-depth interviews of top and middle managers, we investigate to what extent CSR communication can serve as a means to achieve organizational identification and employee commitment. Based on our findings, we propose a conceptual framework for effective CSR communication.

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Social and nonlinear tariffs on drinking water: Cui bono? Empirical evidence from a natural experiment in France

Numéro: 2017-4

Alexandre MayolSocial and nonlinear tariffs on drinking water: Cui bono? Empirical evidence from a natural experiment in France

Abstract : This empirical study discusses both the incentive and redistributive effects of nonlinear tariffs on the drinking water of developed countries. Using an original panel database based on a natural experience with drinking water in France, we econometrically explore the impact of tariffs changes on consumption (linear versus nonlinear). We demonstrate that this measure reduces global consumption. However, small consumers (<75 m3) benefit from the new tariff program and increase their consumption, whereas the consumption of the others (>75 m3) decreases. Public policy implications of such tariffs on drinking water may lead to a discussion on the design of these tariffs and the quality of the information given on water consumption.

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The importance of sequencing regulatory reforms in the telecom sector: Evidence from MENA countries

Numéro: 2017-3

Carlo Cambini, Riham Ahmed Ezzat et Carine Staropoli – The importance of sequencing regulatory reforms in the telecom sector: Evidence from MENA countries

Abstract : Since the late eighties, governments have designed telecommunication policies aiming at introducing competition. This implies new regulation framework and privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This paper empirically assesses the effect of reforms sequences in the telecommunications sector on the sector performance, by using a sample of 17 Middle East North African (MENA) countries for the period 1995-2010. Countries are free to choose how to proceed notably whether to establish an Independent Regulatory Authority (IRA) before or after privatizing the SOEs, as well as they can create an IRA before introducing competition rather than after. We assume that the choices of reforms sequences are affected by institutional, political and economic variables.

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Public-private partnerships for infrastructure at the sub-national level of government: Opportunities and challenges in France

Numéro: 2017-2

Stéphane Saussier – Public-private partnerships for infrastructure at the sub-national level of government: Opportunities and challenges in France

Abstract : According to the OECD, after a short-lived expansion in reaction to the crisis, public investment has recently experienced a substantial decline in a number of European countries (OECD 2013).  As a natural reaction to these budget cuts, more efficient use of increasingly limited resources is put in the limelight: “Doing more with less” has become the mantra of this decade. Those financial constraints have been translated by a changing role of the government itself. Moving from own production to delegation and externalization, the public sector has shifted its focus from dealing with the internal bureaucracy to managing relations with external partners through public-private partnerships. As a result of this transition, which began before the financial crisis, the typical job description of public managers and bureaucrats has significantly changed over the last decades.

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Le contrat de PPP à l’épreuve des contentieux : Retours d’expériences sur le cas français

Numéro: 2017-1

Thierry Kirat et Frédéric Marty – Le contrat de PPP à l’épreuve des contentieux : Retours d’expériences sur le cas français

Résumé : Contrats de long terme portant sur des services complexes, les partenariats public-privé peuvent donner lieu à des différends entre les contractants ou avec d’autres parties prenantes tant dans leurs phases de passation que d’exécution. Se fondant principalement sur le cas des contrats de partenariat français, cette contribution s’attache successivement aux différends entre les deux partenaires, en abordant les cas des renégociations et des résiliations contractuelles, avant de s’attacher aux contentieux initiés par des tiers, qu’il s’agisse de candidats évincés ou d’autres parties prenantes entamant des recours contre les contrats. Elle porte enfin sur la gestion par les partenaires du risque juridique lié aux recours et à ses éventuelles conséquences pour la personne publique.

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When does ideology matter? An empirical analysis of French municipalities’ make-or-buy choices

Numéro: 2016-5

Jean Beuve and Zoé Le Squeren – When does ideology matter? An empirical analysis of French municipalities’ make-or-buy choices

Abstract: Many empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local government decisions regarding the management of public services. In those studies, ideological motives are often found to be not, or at least very slightly, significant. This absence of ideological impact is often interpreted as a proof that local governments are more and more guided by pragmatic rather than ideological motivations, notably because contracting out has become less controversial.

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The law of small numbers: Investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

Numéro: 2016-4

Lisa Chever, Stéphane Saussier and Anne Yvrande-BillonThe law of small numbers: Investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

Abstract: A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU-member states to procure small contracts (OECD, 2010). In this paper, we investigate this paradox.

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Les obligations à impact social : une nouvelle génération de PPP pour les politiques sociales ?

Numéro: 2016-3

Frédéric MARTY – Les obligations à impact social : une nouvelle génération de PPP pour les politiques sociales ?

Résumé : Expérimentés depuis quelques années au Royaume-Uni et aux Etats-Unis, les Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) visent à faire financer par des investisseurs privés des programmes sociaux en conditionnant leur remboursement et leur niveau de rémunération financière à la réalisation d’objectifs de performance. 

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Le diable est-il dans l’annexe ? Les risques budgétaires des PPP saisis par le traitement des passifs éventuels

Numéro: 2016-2

Frédéric MARTY – Le diable est-il dans l’annexe ? Les risques budgétaires des PPP saisis par le traitement des passifs éventuels

Résumé : Les contrats publics globaux à long terme, dont les PPP, ont été vivement critiqués par la Cour des comptes, et par le rapport d’information des sénateurs Portelli et Sueur, sur la base des risques budgétaires qui leur sont associés. Cette contribution porte sur un des facteurs de risque induits par les montages financiers des PPP, à savoir les clauses de garanties que peut accorder l’autorité publique pour faciliter leur bouclage ou réduire leurs coûts.

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Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?

Numéro: 2016-1

Marco BUSO, Frederic MARTY, and Phuong Tra TRAN – Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?

Résumé : The use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to realize and operate public infrastructures is often associated with fiscal circumventing motivations.Using data at the municipal level, this paper investigates whether budget-constrained public authorities adopt PPPs in order to hide public debts. The results show that financial di culties often lead to a preference for PPPs instead of traditional forms of public procure- ment. However, this behavior is not explained by the possibility of debt hiding. We then discuss alternative explanations for these findings.

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Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Numéro: 2015-6

Laure ATHIAS and Stéphane SAUSSIERAre Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Abstract : Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is
exogenous.Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Contractual Choices and Technical Efficiency in Public Procurement: The Case of Regional Railway Transport in France

Numéro: 2015-5

Miguel Amaral and Jean-Christophe Thiebaud – Contractual Choices and Technical Efficiency in Public Procurement: The Case of Regional Railway Transport in France

Abstract: This paper contributes to the analysis of the impact of contractual design on the performance in public procurement. It focuses on the case of railway regional transport in France, where the regions were given the prerogatives of transport organising authorities in 2002.

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Vertical Separation in Rail Transport: How do Prices Influence Coordination?

Numéro: 2015-4

Miguel Amaral and Jean-Christophe Thiebaud – Vertical Separation in Rail Transport: How do Prices Influence Coordination?

Abstract: This paper contributes to the debates over the relative performance of governance modes in network industries. The issues of vertical separation and integration in network industries have been extensively studied from several perspectives including competition eff ect, production cost synergies or coordination costs.

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The Quality of Governance and the Use of Negotiated Procurement Procedures: Evidence from the European Union

Numéro: 2015-3

Eshien Chong, Michael Klien and Stéphane SaussierThe Quality of Governance and the Use of Negotiated Procurement Procedures: Evidence from the European Union

Abstract: A key phase in any public-private contracting setting involves the selection of a private contracting partner. Although open competitive tenders (open auctions) are usually the preferred mechanism, recent developments in the academic literature have pointed out that alternatives mechanisms, such as restricted competitive tenders or negotiations, may in fact be a better way to select a private contractor when the contract to be awarded is difficult to specify (Goldberg, 1977; Kelman, 2005; Bajari et al., 2009).

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Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Numéro: 2015-2

Jean Beuve, Marian Moszoro and Stéphane SaussierPolitical Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Abstract: We compare procurement contracts where the procurer is either a public agent or a private corporation. Using algorithmic data reading and textual analysis on a rich dataset of contracts for a standardized product and service from a single provider, we find that public contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and their renegotiation is formalized more frequently in amendments.

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The Permeability of Public Contracts: Evidence from Renegotiations in the French Car Park Sector

Numéro: 2015-1

Zoé Le Squeren and John Moore – The Permeability of Public Contracts: Evidence from Renegotiations in the French Car Park Sector

Abstract: Recent research suggests that public and private agreements are inherently different. Public contracts should indeed be more permeable to the external (and, more specifically, the political) environment. This paper studies empirically the intrinsic differences between these two types of contracting.

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Water LPEs in Cities: Three Case Studies

Numéro: 2014-13

Marianne Audette-Chapdelaine, Michael Klien et Maria SalvettiWater LPEs in Cities: Three Case Studies

Abstract: The failure or success of providing public services like drinking water through different institutional arrangements may depend crucially and in a non-trivial way from the administrative capacity. A strand of literature deals with this question and what administrative capacities are required for governments to adapt to these situations (Brown and Potoski (2003)). Initially, pre-existing administrative capacities will impact on the decision to organize a public service through direct public management or otherwise. In addition, administrative capacities developed through the provision process, once the governance structure is decided, will also impact on the service performance and at the end, on the willingness to switch from one governance structure to another. The objective of the three case studies, looking carefully at three cities (Stuttgart – Germany, Montréal – Canada, and Brest – France), is to highlight key features of such relationships between administrative capacity and choices made by cities to organize their water public services.

Local Public Enterprises: A Taxonomy

Numéro: 2014-12

Stéphane Saussier et Michael KlienLocal Public Enterprises: A Taxonomy

Abstract: Local public enterprises (LPE) represent a popular mode of public service delivery in OECD countries. In Europe, where the use of LPEs is particularly pronounced, local governments use not only public enterprises integrated into the administration but also 16,000 legally independent organizations, which they own at least partially. The use of LPEs varies, however, greatly between countries and is largely determined by the allocation of public service delivery between public and private sector as well as the functional decentralization in federal systems. In this report, we develop a comprehensive taxonomy of LPEs along three criteria: directly managed LPEs, corporatized LPEs and mixed (intermunicipal and public private) LPEs.

This work has been coordinated by Claire Charbit.

Elections and project delivery in public work procurement: A red ribbon effect?

Numéro: 2014-11

Eshien Chong, Michael Klien et John MooreElections and project delivery in public work procurement: A red ribbon effect? 

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the electoral cycle empirically using data on public work procurement in 1,634 French municipalities between 2005 and 2007. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we compare public work procurement of municipalities whose mayor was a candidate in the 2007 legislative elections with those of municipalities whose mayor did not run. We find that public work contracts are more likely to end in the years preceding the legislative election in municipalities whose mayor ran in the election. We interpret these observations as indications that electoral considerations influence the conduct of public procurement. In particular, our results suggest that mayors running for legislative elections in France attempted to enhance their election perspective by influencing the timing of project delivery in public work procurement. We consider several potential mechanisms to explain our results.

Procedural Rules and their Impact on Procurement Outcomes: Evidence from France

Numéro: 2014-10

Anissa Boulemia et John MooreProcedural Rules and their Impact on Procurement Outcomes: Evidence from France

Abstract: For the last 20 years, a series of public procurement reforms has sought to enhance the efficiency of purchases by increasing public buyers’ discretionary power. Yet it has been argued that there is a lack of empirical results concerning the impact of such reforms on outcomes, including efficiency. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by studying the use of the French “adapted procedure”, a tendering procedure that allows discretion to public buyers to adapt the procedure to their needs.

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La renégociation dans les PPPs : risques et opportunités

Numéro: 2014-9

Jean Beuve, Aude Le Lannier et Zoé Le SquerenLa renégociation dans les PPPs : risques et opportunités

Plan : Les PPPs présentent des spécificités qui font de leurs renégociations un sujet d’étude essentiel. Sources d’efficience par les nécessaires adaptations contractuelles qu’elles permettent ou au contraire d’inefficience de par leur nature opportuniste, les renégociations des contrats de PPPs recouvrent une réalité complexe. Ce chapitre décrit dans un premier temps les différents types de comportements opportunistes auxquels sont confrontés les PPPs.

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L’évolution des conditions de financement des contrats de PPP

Numéro: 2014-8

Frédéric Marty – L’évolution des conditions de financement des contrats de PPP

Plan : Notre propos dans ce chapitre est de retracer les évolutions dans les montages financiers utilisés dans les contrats de PPP depuis les vingt dernières années et de mettre en exergue leur sensibilité aux conditions d’accès aux marchés des fonds prêtables. Nous montrons d’abord que les PPP se sont initialement développés dans un contexte financier favorable lequel a permis de profiter de fonds abondants et peu coûteux.

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Les outils de régulation des partenariats public-privé

Numéro: 2014-7

Lisa Chever et Aude Le Lannier – Les outils de régulation des partenariats public-privé

Plan : Une première section de ce chapitre présentera les outils avancés, par la littérature théorique, pour sélectionner efficacement son partenaire. Ces mécanismes étant rarement suffisants pour garantir l’efficacité de la gestion du service sur toute la durée de vie du contrat, une deuxième section sera dédiée aux mécanismes de régulation ex post, une fois le contrat attribué.

Public Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment

Numéro: 2014-6

Antonio Estache et Stéphane SaussierPublic Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment

Abstract: Over the last 35 years or so, governements around the world have enhanced the participation of private actors to deliver a wide variety of goods and services, traditionally delivered by the public sector. The development of public-private partnerships (PPPs) has been, and continues to be, one of the most popular contractual forms this increased private sector role has taken.

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IPPP Risks and Opportunities: An Economic Perspective

Numéro: 2014-5

J. de Brux et F. Marty – IPPP Risks and Opportunities: An Economic Perspective

Abstract: This article analyzes some of the issues raised by institutionalized public-private partnerships in an economic perspective. We demonstrate that although they may address some of the main limits of purely contractual public-private partnerships, such as the issues of control, know-how transfer, or additional financial cost, they may induce some intrinsic risks, related to alterations of the contractual incentive structure and judicial challenges.

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Quality of Outsourced Services, Rent-Seeking and Contract Design. Evidence from Cleaning Contracts.

Numéro: 2014-4

Quality of Outsourced Services, Rent-Seeking and Contract Design. Evidence from Cleaning Contracts.

Jean Beuve and Lisa Chever

Abstract: This paper estimates the impact of contract design on the enforceability of quality in outsourced public contracts. Using a four-year panel data of 102 cleaning contracts, our findings suggest that quality enforcement highly depends on the ex ante contracting process.

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The Ineffectiveness of Fuel Taxes in France

Numéro: 2014-2

S. Porcher et T. Porcher, 2014 – The Ineffectiveness of Fuel Taxes in France

Abstract: Fuel taxes can be employed to correct externalities associated with pollution and raise government revenue. In this paper, we decompose fuel taxes from tax-exclusive fuel prices to see how consumers respond to market versus policy-driven fuel price changes. Our analysis reveals that fuel taxes might be an inefficient means of achieving the various goals for which they have been assigned by governments.


The network efficiency rate: a key performance indicator for water services asset management?

Numéro: 2014-1

Maria Salvetti – The network efficiency rate: a key performance indicator for water services asset management?

Abstract: In France, good governance of public water and sanitation services revolves around the definition and monitoring of performance indicators designed as steering tools and targeting results. Among the 29 statutory performance indicators, the network efficiency rate plays a key role in water services asset management.

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L’évolution des conditions de financement des contrats de PPP : quels impacts de la crise financière ?

Numéro: 2013-3

Frédéric Marty – L’évolution des conditions de financement des contrats de PPP : quels impacts de la crise financière ?

AbstractLe recours aux contrats de partenariat public-privé (PPP) peut induire un certain nombre d’avantages pour les partenaires publics, lesquels tiennent notamment à une couverture contre les risques de dérives de délais et de coûts. Ces derniers peuvent être particulièrement importants dans les projets publics et leurs conséquences sont d’autant plus dommageables que la personne publique considérée fait face à de fortes contraintes budgétaires.

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The Direct and Indirect Effect of Safety Regulation on Service Quality: a Cautionary Tale from the French "Robien Law"

Numéro: 2013-2

The Direct and Indirect Effect of Safety Regulation on Service Quality: a Cautionary Tale from the French « Robien Law »

Lisa Chever et Michael Klien (Chaire EPPP)

Abstract: To deal with elevators accidents the French ’Robien law’ mandated a modernization of ’old’ elevators until 2008. Although available statistics suggest that the law led to a reduction of mortal accidents, a seemingly paradoxical side effect occurred: the modernization coincides with an unprecedented deterioration in service quality, doubling the average elevator downtime and tripling the number of breakdowns.

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Innovation and regulatory outcomes: Evidence from the public-private contracts for water supply in France

Numéro: 2012-11

Innovation and regulatory outcomes: Evidence from the public-private contracts for water supply in France

Freddy Huet (Université de la Réunion) and Simon Porcher (IAE Paris)

Abstract: One of the most important pitfalls associated with public-private partnership schemes (PPPs) conducted in natural monopoly industries is the difficulty of replacing the winning firm after a contract has been signed.

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Une estimation des coûts d’efficience des tarifs actuels des services publics de l’eau en France

Numéro: 2012-10

Une estimation des coûts d’efficience des tarifs actuels des services publics de l’eau en France

Simon Porcher (IAE Paris)

Abstract: Un résultat communément accepté dans la littérature sur la régulation des services publics (Coase [1946]) est que l’efficience du marché exige un recours à des tarifs binômes avec d’une part un prix marginal égal au coût marginal et d’autre part un prix fixe correspondant à la part de coûts fixes prise en charge par chaque abonné.

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Discretion and Efficiency in Public Procurement: Evidence from France

Numéro: 2012-9

Lisa Chever et John Moore (Chaire EPPP)

Abstract : The new European legislative proposals on public procurement suggest widening the possibility for public buyers to use negotiated procedures with publication. Such procedures have been available in France for work contracts up to 5 million euros since 2004. Yet, their impact on public procurement efficiency is still to be assessed.

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Do Markets Reduce Prices?

Numéro: 2012-7

Do Markets Reduce Prices?

Simon Porcher (IAE Paris)

Abstract: This paper looks at the reasons for and the results of the make-or-buy decisions in local public services, with specific regards to its possible effects on price and other performance determinants. It uses a rich city-level dataset of water utilities in France for several years.

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L’efficacité des contrats de partenariat en France : Une première évaluation quantitative

Numéro: 2012-6

L’efficacité des contrats de partenariat en France : Une première évaluation quantitative

Phuong Tra Tran et Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP)

Abstract: Ce travail a été réalisé par la chaire Economie des Partenariats Public Privé de l’Institut d’Administration des Entreprises de Paris Sorbonne, avec le soutien de la Mission d’appui aux Partenariats Public Privé (MaPPP).

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Water under the Bridge: City Size, Bargaining Power, Prices and Franchise Renewals in the Provision of Water

Numéro: 2012-5

Water under the Bridge: City Size, Bargaining Power, Prices and Franchise Renewals in the Provision of water

Eshien Chong (Chaire EPPP), Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP), Brian S. Silverman (Rotman Business School, U. of Toronto)

Abstract: Since Williamson’s 1976 study of franchise bidding for natural monopolies, there has been extensive debate concerning the degree to which transaction-cost problems actually afflict government franchising in practice.

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The political side of public utilities: how opportunistic behavior and yardstick competition shape water prices in Austria

Numéro: 2012-4

The political side of public utilities: how opportunistic behavior and yardstick competition shape water prices in Austria

Michael Klien (Chaire EPPP)

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of politics on water prices in Austria. When public utilities are under political control, price setting may be affected by political incentives.

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Corporatization and the behavior of public firms: how shifting control rights affects political interference

Numéro: 2012-3

Corporatization and the behavior of public firms: how shifting control rights affects political interference

Michael Klien (Chaire EPPP)

Abstract: As an alternative to privatization, corporatization implies a shift of control rights from politicians to managers while ownership remains public. Even though corporatized firms are fairly common – both in Europe and the US – little empirical work has tried to quantify the effects of corporatizations.

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Timing tariff increases over the electoral cycles : an empirical investigation of political decision making

Numéro: 2012-2

Timing tariff increases over the electoral cycles : an empirical investigation of political decision making

Michael Klien (chaire EPPP)

Abstract: This paper uses data on municipal tariff decisions to analyze the effect of elections on policy choices. Like existing research, the results confirm the existence of a political cycle in fiscal policy.

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Relational Contract and Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness. Experimental Evidence.

Numéro: 2011-5

Relational Contract and Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness. Experimental Evidence.

Jean Beuve and Claudine Desrieux

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the interaction between relational contracting and endogenous contractual incompleteness. To account for contractual relationships with perspective of future interactions, we design an infinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players.

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Renegotiations, Discretion and Contract Renewals, An Empirical Analysis of Public-Private Agreements

Numéro: 2011-4

Renegotiations, Discretion and Contract Renewals, An Empirical Analysis of Public-Private Agreements

Jean Beuve, Julie De Brux et Stéphane Saussier

Abstract:This paper studies how renegotiations influence ongoing contractual relationships. By using an original dataset of 252 expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we explore the link between  renegotiations and subsequent contract renewals.

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Cartels Facing Competition in Public Procurement: An Empirical Analysis

Numéro: 2011-3

Abstract : We analyse bidder collusion in public procurement. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels. Using public information on convicted bid-rigging schemes taken from the decisions of the French Competition Authority, we have constructed an original database on 33 different cartels operating in 114 public work tenders.

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Design Contractuel et Renégociations: Impacts sur l’Efficacité de la Concurrence par Comparaison

Numéro: 2011-2

Design Contractuel et Renégociations: Impacts sur l’Efficacité de la Concurrence par Comparaison

Aude Le Lannier (IAE Paris, Chaire EPPP & GREGOR)

Résumé: Les modèles de concurrence par comparaison supposent que le régulateur dispose d’une capacité d’engagement totale. Cela se traduit par la signature de contrats rigides et non renégociés. Or, on constate que c’est rarement le cas en réalité.

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Enforcement of Yardstick Contracts & Consistency in Performance Rankings : An Application to the Water Industry in England and Wales

Numéro: 2011-1

Enforcement of Yardstick Contracts & Consistency in Performance Rankings : An Application to the Water Industry in England and Wales

Aude Le Lannier (IAE Paris, Chaire EPPP & GREGOR)

Abstract: This paper aims to determine the extent to which enforcement difficulties of yardstick competition implemented by the regulator of the UK water and sewerage sector (Ofwat) may come from a lack of reliability of the benchmarking results established by Ofwat.

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Enchères ou négociations dans les marchés publics: Une analyse empirique

Numéro: 2010-9

Enchères ou négociations dans les marchés publics: Une analyse empirique

Eshien Chong (ADIS, Paris 11), Carine Staropoli (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Anne Yvrande-Billon (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne).

Résumé:Un acheteur public doit-il attribuer un marché public au moyen d’une enchère ou par la négociation directe ? Pour traiter de cette question, nous examinons trois déterminants pouvant influencer le choix d’une procédure d’attribution des marchés publics.

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Monitoring Policy and Organizational Forms in Franchised Chains

Numéro: 2010-8

Monitoring Policy and Organizational Forms in Franchised Chains

Thierry Pénard (CREM, Université de Rennes I), Emmanuel Raynaud (INRA & CES, Université Paris I) and Stéphane Saussier (IAE Sorbonne Grad School)

Abstract: Franchising is nowadays a prominent way to organize the distribution sector. While previous literature suggests that monitoring issues are a critical determinant of organizational choices, it is rather silent on the optimal monitoring strategy once the organization of the chain is set.

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Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model

Numéro: 2010-7

Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model

Miguel Amaral (CES, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Stéphane Saussier (IAE Sorbonne Grad School) and Anne Yvrande-Billon (CES, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract : In this paper the authors investigate the relationship between cost and number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London.

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Putting all one’s eggs in one Basket: Relational contracts and the provision of local public services (new version)

Numéro: 2010-6

Putting all one’s eggs in one Basket: Relational contracts and the provision of local public services (new version)

Claudine Desrieux (ERMES, Université Paris II), Eshien Chong (ADIS/GRJM, Université Paris XI) & Stéphane Saussier (IAE Paris)

Abstract: The provision of local public services is increasingly being contracted out to private companies.

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Hazards in Transfering Knowledge and Contractual Architecture: The Case of Payment Schemes in Technology Licensing Agreements

Numéro: 2010-5

Hazards in Transfering Knowledge and Contractual Architecture: The Case of Payment Schemes in Technology Licensing Agreements

Christian Bessy (IDHE, CNRS), Eric Brousseau (Economix, Université Paris X) & Stéphane Saussier (IAE Paris)

Abstract: This article provides an empirical assessment of payment schemes implemented in technology licensing agreements. Following a new institutional and resource-based view analysis, we argue that transaction costs evolve with the quality of the protection provided to the licensor by the institutional environment, the nature of the resources exchanged, and the characteristics of partners.

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Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence

Numéro: 2010-4

Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence

Eshien Chong (ADIS – Paris 11), Carine Staropoli  (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Anne Yvrande-Billon (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract: The relative efficiency of auctions and negotiations is still a puzzle in the literature. While auctions are the prescribed procedures and the most used ones for public procurement, in the private sector, where buyers are free to choose their purchasing method, competitive tendering is far from being their preferred option (Bajari et al. 2009).

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Interfirm Cooperation in Strategic Relationships: The Role of Formal Contract

Numéro: 2010-2

Interfirm Cooperation in Strategic Relationships: The Role of Formal Contract

Jean Beuve (Chaire EPPP ) and Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP)

Abstract: In this paper, we use a large database of more than 3700 strategic relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner’s reputation and the perceived balance of the relationship.

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The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts

Numéro: 2010-1

The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts

Julie de Brux (Chaire EPPP & Vinci)

Abstract: Renegotiations of public-private partnerships have recently been the subject of much attention. Economists regularly analyse them through the lens of ‘hold up’ theories. According to these models, renegotiations are a problem to be avoided: renegotiations become opportunistic because agents are self-interested, and they use renegotiation to seek rents.

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The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions

Numéro: 2009-7

The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions

Laure Athias (IDHEAP/SPAN, Université de Lausanne) & Antonio Nunez (Laboratoire d’Economie des transports)

Abstract: In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for toll road concession contracts. Such auctions are common-value auctions for incomplete contracts prone to pervasive renegotiations.

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Partenariats public-privé et investissements de fin de contrat : le cas de l’industrie de l’eau en France

Numéro: 2009-6

Eshien CHONG (ADIS/GRJM, Université Paris 11) et Freddy HUET (GREDEG, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis)

Résumé : L’efficacité des partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans les industries de service public en réseau a été remise en cause par de nombreux auteurs. Une des défaillances majeure reprochée à ce type d’accords concerne le manque d’incitation de l’opérateur en place à investir en fin de contrat.

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Appels d’offres concurrentiels et avantage au sortant, une étude empirique du secteur du transport public urbain en France

Numéro: 2009-5

Appels d’offres concurrentiels et avantage au sortant, une étude empirique du secteur du transport pubic urbain en France

Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris I Sorbonne)

Résumé: Cet article porte sur les déterminants de la reconduction des contrats de services publics attribués par appels d’offres concurrentiels. Partant de la constatation que ces contrats changent très rarement de mains, on s’interroge sur les raisons de cette stabilité des prestataires de services publics.

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Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector

Numéro: 2009-4

Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector

Axel GAUTIER (HEC-ULg and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain) & Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris 1 Sorbonne)

Abstract: In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm by the mean of a fixed-term regulatory contract.  This contract specifies the duties of the firm and a financial compensation.

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Make or Buy Urban Public Transport Services : A Rational Choice?

Numéro: 2009-3

Make or Buy Urban Public Transport Services: A Rational Choice?
Miguel AMARAL & Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract: In this article, our aim is to study the determinants of the trade-off between in-house and outsourced utilities provision.  More precisely, we focus on the French urban public transport sector.

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The Rational of Plural Forms: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level

Numéro: 2009-2

Didier Chabaud – Thema, U. Cergy Pontoise, Arnaud Lavit d’Hautefort – Ytae, et Stéphane Saussier – Gregor, U. Paris 1

Abstract: In this article, we investigate the relative performances of companyowned outlets vs. franchised outlets using an original database consisting of 150 units of a French chain.

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Putting all one’s eggs in one Basket: Relational contracts and the provision of local public services

Numéro: 2009-1

Claudine Desrieux – ERMES, U. Paris 2, Eshien Chong – ADIS, U. Paris 11 et Stéphane Saussier – GREGOR, U. Paris 1

Abstract: The contracting out of local public services has kept on increasing over the past decades. We observe that local governments regularly choose the same private operator for their different services, i.e. they “bundle » and delegate them to a single firm. We develop a model of relational contracts that shows how this strategy may lead to better performance at lower cost for the public authority. Such a proposition is tested and corroborated using an original database concerning the contractual choices made by 5000 French local public authorities in 1998, 2001 and 2004.

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