Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts

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Abstract

The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation is a political risk adaptation by which public agents limit hazards from opportunistic third parties—political opponents, competitors, interest groups—and externalize the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Public agents endogenize the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties’ expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions: scrutiny increases public contracting efficiency in costly litigation environments, concentrated (politically) contestable markets, and with upwardly biased beliefs about benefits of challenge.

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In contrast to private contracts, public contracts are open to challenge by third parties. The whiff of corruption and the concern for misuse of other people’s monies make challenging public contracts feasible. Even though the enactment and performance of a contract may be honest and legal, public agents may fear politically motivated challenges, and hence will \textit{ex ante} adjust the nature of the contracts so as to limit those features whose probity may be questioned. These adjustments will imply more contract specificity in design and rigidity in implementation. Such contractual adaptation, however, is not costless. Contractors’ perception of specificity and rigidity will translate into \textit{ex ante} higher prices as well as the enactment of stronger compensating clauses. The contractual complexity and adaptation required to limit the potential for third-party challenges, whether opportunistic or not, make public contracting look “inefficient.”

The higher level of contract specificity and rigidity in public contracting can be understood, then, as a political risk adaptation by public agents. It is not that civic-oriented legislation limits public agents’ discretionary actions with “red tape,” but rather that public agents limit the risk of third parties’ challenges through contract formalities and rigidities, externalizing the associated costs to the public at large.

This paper provides an operationalization of Spiller’s third-party opportunism (TPO), towards an understanding of the organizational foundations of pricing, specificity, and rigidity—the outer features—of public contracts. Spiller’s theory of public organization is rooted in a transaction cost-\textit{cum}-positive political theory, where the nature of the organizational adaptation of public contracts results from their inherent hazards. Spiller’s framework follows Williamson’s four cornerstones of the economics of governance—namely, governance, transaction costs, adaptation, and interdisciplinary social science—and introduces third-party opportunism as the quintessential hazard of public transactions.

\footnote{What Williamson (1999) calls the hazard of probity posed by transactions organized in the public sector.}
\footnote{As Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) underscore, “when something goes wrong in a public sector network, it tends to end up on the front page of the newspaper, instantly transforming a management issue into a political problem.”}
\footnote{Williamson (2005) defines governance as “the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains.”}
\footnote{Acknowledging that hierarchies and procurement are “alternative methods of coordinating production” (Coase 1937, 388).}
\footnote{Not only though the price system, but also as a managerial decision.}
\footnote{The need to incorporate insights from law, political science, and sociology to understand what the rough price theory cannot fully capture.}
1 Prior Literature

Third-party opportunism relates to a threefold literature on public contracting: industrial organization, public administration, and political economy.

In the industrial organization literature, public contract pricing is fundamentally determined by informational costs, arising from informational asymmetries, the extent of verifiability of information and the presence of repeated interactions (Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Laffont and Tirole 1993; Loeb and Surysekar 1994; Macaulay 1963). It is, however, the nature of the hazards involved in public-private relations that determines the fundamental features of public procurement and contracting. Not only is “the nature of the agreement [...] carefully delimited, and the more formal features govern when [...] terms are contested,” but the potential for a contest from an excluded seller what impacts the nature of the agreement (Marshall, Meurer, and Richard 1994a).

Whereas the parties in private-private relations adapt to new information as it becomes available in order to save litigation costs, and courts are used rather to terminate disputes, public contracts appear bureaucratic and over-monitoring in situations in which it is not needed (Prendergast 2003, 932–933). According to the public administration view, contracting inefficiencies are associated with the large number of formal processes that appear to be essential to ensure the public sector’s functions as well as with “red tape,” i.e., costly and compulsory rules, regulations and procedures with no efficacy for their functional object (Bozeman 1993, 274). Bureaucrats are used only for “hard” agency problems, where consumers cannot be trusted (Prendergast 2003, 933). Extensive rules and regulations arise from dividing authority among the separate branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial), designed to prevent abuses of power, protect people’s rights (Baldwin 1990, 10–11), and reflect equity values not necessarily present in private firms, including educational, health-related, legal, and environmental (Forrer et al. 2010, 480). Red tape regulations are intended to decrease public employees’ uncertainty about how they should behave (Kurland and Egan 1999, 440). Both formalities and red tape are the instruments by which bureaucracies restrict public agents’ discretion (Boyne 2002; Lan and Rainey 1992) and “overcome the temptation to capitulate to consumers simply to avoid complaints” (Prendergast 2003, 932).

The political economy profession has long been divided into advocates of public interest
theory (in line with the public sector motivation literature), and “capture” or interest group
theory of government intervention in industries, seeded by Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965),
and elaborated by Stigler (1971). This positive approach, both in its Chicago school (Becker
1983; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) and Virginia school (Buchanan 1975; Buchanan, Tollison,
and Tullock 1980) modalities, concentrates on the demand-side, “black-boxing” the supply-
side of political decision-making (Laffont and Tirole 1993 475–476). On the other hand,
positive political theory scholars, led by Riker (1963), focused on the supply-side of political
decision-making, studying how politics—legislative procedures, administrative procedures,
and bureaucratic oversight—affects legislative, judicial, and regulatory behavior. Positive
political scholars have also studied the use of interested parties (McCubbins and Schwartz
1984; de Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999) and consumers (Prendergast 2003) as
instruments of oversight.

Laffont and Tirole (1993) emphasize that the link “between procurement and regulation
and the associated administrative and political constraints is still unknown to us or is still
in a state of conjecture. [...] Institutions are endogenous and should as much as possible
be explained by primitive considerations.” This paper is an attempt to rationalize the basic
features of public contracting from its primitive considerations: its fundamental hazards.

2 A Model of Third-Party Opportunism

2.1 Signaling Process: Hazards into Rigidity

We focus our analysis on the public agent’s perspective. Furthermore, we ignore sunk costs to
abstract from governmental opportunism and to make the argument on TPO straightforward.

There are four agents explicitly and implicitly involved in public contracting:

1. Incumbent public agent

2. Private contractor

3. Third-party challengers, i.e., political opponents to the incumbent public agent, com-

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7 See, for example, Ferejohn (1990), Gely and Spiller (1990), McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987)
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8 See Spiller (2008) and references therein.
petitors to the contractor, and interest groups

4. Public at large, i.e., voters and courts

The signaling process starts before the contract is signed. The public agent receives project features and budget \(P^{bud}\) to contract for goods and services. The public agent perceives the threat of potential third-party challenges and tries to minimize political risks and maintain political support. The private contractor may not be directly aware of the hazards faced by the public agent, but observes contract specificity and rigidity. Specificity and rigidity equal less adaptability, higher contracting and implementation costs, and hence higher final prices charged to the public agent. Third parties privately perceive the benefits from challenge. Contract features affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting political outcomes. If a public contract does not meet the public’s expectations, political consequences may include weakened chances of re-election for incumbent public agents (Forrer et al. 2010, 480).

2.2 Conceptualizing Contract Specificity and Rigidity

Contract specificity refers to \textit{ex ante} complexity of subject, completeness of clauses, technical provisions, and processing costs (Laffont and Tirole 1993, 307). Contract rigidity refers to \textit{ex post} enforcement, penalties, hardness, and intolerance to adaptation of contracts\(^9\) and normally correlates with contract specificity: the more specific the contract is, the more rigid its implementation and enforcement is expected to be. Otherwise, if the contract is specific and then the parties agree to deviate, third parties can accuse the contracting parties of collusion.

Complex public contracts have more contractual rigidities than simpler contracts. The cost of \textit{ex post} enforcement increases in complexity. Because the public sector has more ambiguous objectives than private organizations (Boyne 2002), and it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives are achieved (Lan and Rainey 1992), public high specificity and rigidity mitigate ambiguity and problematic evaluation. For example, U.S. Department of Defense directives specify in great detail source selection policies, including the development of objective technical, cost, schedule, manufacturing, performance, and risk criteria, the auction

\(^9\) In this regard, contract rigidity is the opposite of a “best efforts” clause.
techniques, the organization of the selection committee, and the pertinence of contacts with contractors. Public agents must also follow imposed standards of evidence, and may be constrained to formulate standards and follow their own rules to avoid discriminating between distinct situations on the basis of non-verifiable information (Laffont and Tirole 1993).

2.3 Modeling Hazards, Rigidity, and Pricing

In order to illustrate and operationalize the third-party opportunism theory of public contracts, we introduce some simple notation. Third-party challenges may arise from honest attempts to control costs and from opportunistic attempts to replace the public agent. Public agents’ third-party related costs, then, have two components: expected third-party opportunism costs \( E(T) \) concomitant with political costs of loss of office, reputation, and support that arise from contract discretionary terms (flexible contracting), and third-party adaptation costs \( K \) that increase expenses associated with the contract. If a third-party challenge is successful, there are also costs associated with the financial and social costs of a new tender, i.e., time and documentation, or settlement awards made by the winning bidders to protesters in exchange for a promise to drop their protest (Marshall, Meurer, and Richard 1994b). We underline political costs as the main burden for public agents concerning third-party challenges, which are difficult to appraise, let alone to measure financially. The more discretionary the contract terms are, the more room there is for third parties to challenge the contract. Therefore, we assume that expected third-party opportunism costs \( E(T) \)—both honest and opportunistic—can be mitigated by contract specificity and rigidity \( R \in (0, \infty) \).

Hazards faced by the public agent are subject to the likelihood of TPO challenge \( \rho \).
and the likelihood of success of TPO challenge $\tau^{15}$ which are driven by contract complexity (sector-specific) and political contestability.

The likelihood of success of a challenge $\tau$ is common knowledge to all players. Given that it is harder to prove wrongdoing when there is less room for discretionary actions, the likelihood of success of a TPO challenge $\tau$ is assumed to decrease in rigidity $R$, as the courts are more likely to dismiss and the public to ignore challenges to more specific and rigid—"narrower"—contracts. Likewise, in order to fit to more specific and rigid contracts, an opportunistic challenger will have to incur higher monetary, political, and reputational costs of challenge and litigation $c$. Therefore, the cost of challenge and litigation $c$ is assumed to be increasing in rigidity $R$. $\tau$ and $c$ capture the critical institutional features germane to TPO. We formalize these institutional features in Assumptions 1 and 2:

Assumption 1 The likelihood of success of an opportunistic challenge $\tau$ is convex and monotonically decreasing in $R$, so that $\frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} \geq 0$.

Assumption 2 The cost of challenge and litigation $c$ is concave and monotonically increasing in rigidity $R$, so that $\frac{\partial c}{\partial R} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial R^2} \leq 0$.

Expected third-party opportunism costs $E(T)$ depend on the political costs of a successful challenge to the incumbent public agent, and also on the costs of a new tender (documentation, new analyses), cost of externalities (including the value of lost time for users)$^{16}$ and the public agent’s reputation. The slope of $E(T)$ is a function of the likelihood of a successful TPO challenge, i.e., the product of the likelihood of a successful TPO challenge and political costs at fully discretionary contracting.

Definition 1 $E(T) = E[T(R)] = T_0 \rho(R) \tau(R)$

$^{15}$ We use the term “likelihood” instead of “probability” to underline that we refer here to singular public contacts. The likelihood of third-party challenge and the success of the challenge can be compounded, since what makes a challenge actual is its likelihood of success (the likelihood of third-party challenge $\rho$ increases with the likelihood of success of a challenge $\tau$). Every challenge has some probability of success; otherwise the challenger would lose resources and reputation.

$^{16}$ E.g., highway repair generates significant negative externalities for commuters through increased gridlock and commuting times. Lewis and Bajari (2011, 2) take the example of Interstate 35W, a main commuting route in Minneapolis carrying over 175,000 commuters per day. If a highway construction project results in a 30-minute delay each way for commuters on this route, the daily social cost imposed by the construction would be 175,000 hours. If we value time at $10 an hour, this is a social cost of $1.75 million per day. Most public contracts affecting the public at large, from sewage disposal to worse service because of a delay in buying IT equipment, carry externalities.
where $T_0$ is the political third-party cost at lowest possible rigidity level.

Contract design (ex ante specificity), and implementation and enforcement (ex post rigidity) costs are subject to contract preparation time, professionals (lawyers, engineers, consultants), documentation, and control needed, as well as discounted penalties due to deviations from contract at specificity and rigidity $R$. Penalties and part of these adaptation costs are borne directly by the contractor ($K_{pr}$) and reflected in the contract price, and part is borne only by the public agent ($K_{pu}$). We assume adaptation costs $K$—both public and private, and so contract price $P$—to be increasing in $R$. The slope of the $K$ curve is a function of the marginal positive and increasing cost (effort) of adaptation—what Laffont and Tirole (1993, 307) call “processing costs”—and penalties at $R$.

**Assumption 3** Adaptation costs $K$ are strictly convex and monotonically rising in rigidity $R$, so that $\frac{\partial K}{\partial R} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 K}{\partial R^2} > 0$.

The price $P$ bid by the contractor is the sum of operating costs (company-specific), adaptation costs for the private contractor (contract-specific subject to rigidity $R$), and a mark-up (economic profit). The contractor’s maximum bid price is $P^{bud}$. To simplify our argument, we assume a uniform technology across firms and a competitive (or Bertrand competition) bidding market, such that $P$ is the lowest possible cost subject to zero economic profit and follows private adaptation costs $K_{pr}$. We also assume away governmental opportunism, i.e., direct or incremental expropriation by the public agent.

Third parties’ beliefs about political benefits of opportunism at discretionary contracting $\tilde{T}_0$ are assumed to be distributed normally, with mean $\mu$ and standard deviation $\sigma^2$. Their competitive environment is given by concentration parameter $\zeta \in (0, 1]$. If $\zeta = 1$, the TPO challenger’s benefits are symmetrical to the incumbent public agent’s TPO costs (bi-partisan or duopolistic market); if $\zeta < 1$, the political market is oligopolistic and the challenger may not internalize all benefits from a successful contract protest.
2.4 Existence of an Internal Equilibrium

We define the following objective functions for the agents:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Incumbent public agent:} & \quad \text{minimize} \quad & & \mathbb{E}[T(R) \mid \tau] + K(P, R) \\
& & & \text{subject to} \quad K = K_{pr}(R) + K_{pu}(P, R), P_{bud} \geq K_{pr} \\
\text{Private contractor:} & \quad \text{maximize} \quad & & (P - K_{pr}) \mid R \\
& & & \text{subject to} \quad P_{bud} \geq P \geq K_{pr} \\
\text{Third-party challengers:} & \quad \text{maximize} \quad & & q[T_0 \zeta \tau - c] \mid R \\
& & & \text{subject to} \quad 0 < \zeta \leq 1
\end{align*}
\]

Third parties maximize benefits from an opportunistic challenge are given \(T_0, \zeta, \text{and } c\) and conditional on \(\tau\) at \(R\). If the challenge is realized \((q = 1)\), third parties’ benefits equal \(T_0 \zeta \tau - c\).

Given TPO, bid price \(P\) equals \(K_{pr} \mid R\), which also minimizes \(K_{pu} \mid R\).

The public agent endogenizes the likelihood of challenge \(\rho\) by adjusting specificity and rigidity \(R\). The upper bound of the likelihood of a TPO challenge \(\rho\) is given by the probability of a positive expected benefit for third parties, i.e., it is the complementary of the cumulative probability of third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge being equal or lower than the cost of challenge \(c\): \(\rho = \Pr(T > c) = 1 - \Pr(T - c \leq 0)\).

An increase in specificity and rigidity \(R\) carries two effects:

1. It lowers the likelihood of success of a TPO challenge \(\tau\); hence, for any given continuous distribution function of third parties’ expected political benefits from contract challenge, it yields a scalar transformation distribution function which is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution function at lower specificity and rigidity \(R\) (downward probabilistic shift of the cumulative distribution curve of expected third-party opportunism benefits \(T\)).

2. It increases cost of challenge \(c\) and thus it decreases the probability at which an opportunistic challenge pays off (rightward move of the cost of litigation).

Figure [I] shows a graphical representation of the combination of these two effects resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of challenge \(\rho\) due to an increase in contract specificity and rigidity \(R\).

\(\rho\) is, therefore, given by the probability of a positive expected value of a challenge \(\Pr(T - c > 0)\). The public agent adjusts \(R\) \textit{ex ante} according to her beliefs about the likelihood of
Figure 1: This graph plots the cumulative probability (y axis) of the public agent’s beliefs about third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (x axis): blue solid line for low rigidity and red dot line for high rigidity contracts. It assumes low rigidity $R^L = 10$, high rigidity $R^H = 30$, a normal distribution of benefits from an opportunistic challenge for third parties $T_0$ ranging from 0 to 100 with $\mu = 30$ and $\sigma = 20$, $\tau = \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1}$, and cost of litigation $c = \gamma R + 10$, where $\gamma = .2$ and 10 are calibration parameters for an increase of $c$ in $R$. The likelihood of a TPO challenge $\rho$ is the complementary cumulative probability of the third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge being lower than the cost of challenge, i.e., $\rho = 1 - \Pr(T_0 < c) = \Pr(T_0 - c \geq 0)$. The cumulative distribution function at high rigidity is first-order stochastically dominated by the cumulative distribution function at low rigidity. An increase in rigidity from $R$ from 10 to 30 induces a decrease in the likelihood of TPO challenge from .5 to .1.

incidence $\rho$ and likelihood of success $\tau$ of third-party challenges. The public agent’s rational expectation of $\rho$ is consistent with third parties’ costs and strategic decision, i.e., $\mathbb{E}(q | R) \equiv \Pr[T_0 \zeta(\tau(R)) > c(R)] \equiv \rho$.

**Proposition 1** The likelihood of challenge $\rho$ is decreasing in rigidity $R$.

**Proposition 2** Expected political third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ are decreasing and globally convex in rigidity $R$.

The intuition that $\mathbb{E}(T)$ falls in $R$ is that the likelihood of a successful TPO challenge can be reduced to negligible by extreme contract rigidity. Alternatively, $\mathbb{E}(T)$ can be seen as the public agent’s disutility of lack of contract flexibility.

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$^{17}$ Proofs are presented in Appendix B.

$^{18}$ The type of specifications we deal with is non-designative, i.e., they do not point to any particular bidder and do not preclude a competitive bidding market. The particular case of designative specifications is developed in Subsection 2.8.
The public agent internalizes expenses related to the contract, i.e., at the end, she is accountable, directly or indirectly, for all costs borne\textsuperscript{19} She has to pay contractors’ costs and her own costs, while aiming at minimizing political costs. The optimal level of rigidity \( R^* \) is, therefore, driven by expected TPO costs, actual adaptation costs, knowledge about \( \tau \), and the public agent’s beliefs about \( \rho \).

Given \( T_0, \, \widetilde{T}_0, \, \tau, \, c, \, \zeta, \) and \( K \), the equilibrium \( \{ q^*, \rho^*, R^*, P^* \} \) is such that:

(a) \( R^* = \arg \min_R [T_0 \rho(R) \tau(R) + K(P, R)] \)

(b) \( \rho^* \equiv \mathbb{E}(q^* \mid R^*) \equiv \Pr[\widetilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau(R^*) > c(R^*)] \)

(c) \( P^* \in [P_{\text{min}}, P_{\text{bad}}] = K_{pr} \mid R^* \)

This solution can be achieved intuitively backwards. Starting from \( R^* \), any deviation from equilibrium makes the public agent worse off:

(a) If \( R < R^* \), then \( \tau(R) > \tau(R^*), c(R) < c(R^*) \), therefore \( \rho > \rho^* \) and \( \mathbb{E}[T(R)] - \mathbb{E}[T(R^*)] > K(P, R^*) - K(P, R) \) (\( \mathbb{E}(T) \) increase offsets gains in \( K \) decrease)

(b) If \( R > R^* \), then \( \mathbb{E}[T(R^*)] - \mathbb{E}[T(R)] < K(P, R) - K(P, R^*) \) (\( K \) increase outmatches gains in \( \mathbb{E}(T) \) decrease)

**Lemma 1** If Assumption \textsuperscript{3} and Proposition \textsuperscript{2} hold and if at low bound rigidity \( R \), the marginal expected third-party opportunism costs \( \mathbb{E}(T) \) decrease is bigger than the marginal adaptation costs \( K \) increase, the sum curve of expected third-party opportunism costs \( \mathbb{E}(T) \) plus adaptation costs \( K \) is U-shaped and has an interior global minimum at \( R^* \).

If \( \mathbb{E}(T) \) does not fall faster in \( R \) than \( K \) increases in \( R \) for low \( R \) states, TPO is irrelevant for the outcome of the contract (e.g., relational contracts). If TPO is a relevant hazard for the public agent, Lemma \textsuperscript{1} implies that the optimal contract is partly flexible and of finite rigidity. A too-flexible contract would be politically too risky while an over-rigid contract would be too expensive. Figure \textsuperscript{2} plots an example of expected third-party opportunism costs \( \mathbb{E}(T) \) falling in rigidity and specificity \( R \), costs borne by the contractor \( K_{pr} \) and adaptation costs \( K \) rising in \( R \), and the U-shaped sum of \( \mathbb{E}(T) + K \) as the objective function of the public agent minimizes.

\textsuperscript{19} See Subsection \textsuperscript{2.6} for a treatment of different levels of internalization of contracting costs.
Corollary 1 In the presence of TPO, the sequential equilibrium public contract that minimizes political and contracting costs is specific and rigid, ergo more expensive in its design, implementation, and control than the theoretical first-best price in the absence of TPO.

A direct outcome from Corollary 1 is that the higher $\mathbb{E}(T)$, ceteris paribus, the higher $R^*$ and $P$ will be.

2.5 Endogeneity of Opportunistic Challenge

The endogeneity of opportunistic challenge provides contractual properties consistent with observations in the practice of public contracting:

(a) Larger contracts are associated with higher expected political benefits for opportunistic third parties (higher mean $\mu$) and, therefore, are associated with higher likelihood of challenge $\rho$. Similarly, $\rho$ increases in the proximity to elections, since potential political gains are discounted at a higher discount factor

(b) Inherent public-private information asymmetries increase with complexity of transactions. The dispersion of third parties’ beliefs about expected political benefits from an
opportunistic challenge $\sigma$ is higher in high informational asymmetry (low scrutiny) states and than in low informational asymmetry ("open accessibility") states

(c) The more dispersed third parties’ beliefs about expected political benefits from an opportunistic challenge is, lower cost of litigation $c$ leads to lower $\rho$ and higher $c$ leads to higher $\rho$

(d) $\rho$ is sensitive to the institutional environment determining $\tau$ and $c$: the higher $\tau$, the higher $\rho$; the higher $c$, the lower $\rho$; the more $\tau$ decreases in $R$, the more $\rho$ will fall in $R$

(e) The rule of law implies, ceteris paribus, higher $\rho$

(f) The lower bound of $\rho$ depends on the third parties’ priors, i.e., the propensity to litigation adherent to the institutional framework

(g) Exogenous institutional changes—e.g., new environmental norms, amendments to the legal system—alter $\tau$ and $c$, and produce a new cumulative probability of challenge distribution, which will first-order stochastically dominate the former distribution when the legal system becomes more restrictive (i.e., an increase in clauses subject to challenge) or will be first-order stochastically dominated by the former distribution when the legal system is deregulated

Figure 3: This graph plots the likelihood of opportunistic challenge $\rho$ for different levels of specificity and rigidity $R$, assuming the same distribution functions of third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge and the same cost of challenge as in Figure 1.
2.6 Scrutiny: A Two-Sided Sword

An increase in scrutiny—i.e., critical public observation and accountability through transparency and public participation—lowers the informational asymmetry between the actual political costs for the incumbent public agent and the third parties’ beliefs about the political benefits from an opportunistic challenge. First, an increase in scrutiny induces a calibration of beliefs about expected political benefits from an opportunistic challenge (lower standard deviation), yielding a second-order stochastically dominant distribution (see Figure 4), with the inflection point at the mean expected political benefits \( \mu_L = \mu_H \) (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, 197–199). Hence, all other things being kept constant (particularly, \( \mu_L = \mu_H \)), an increase in scrutiny leads to an increase in the likelihood of challenge \( \rho \) at low litigation costs \( c \) and to a reduction in \( \rho \) at high \( c \).

**Figure 4:** This graph plots the cumulative probability (y axis) of the public agent’s beliefs about third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (x axis): blue solid line for low scrutiny states and red dot line for high scrutiny states. It assumes rigidity \( R = 10 \), a normal distribution of benefits from an opportunistic challenge for third parties \( T_0 \) with \( \mu = 30, \sigma = 20 \) for low scrutiny states and \( \sigma = 10 \) for high scrutiny states, \( \tau = \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1} \), and \( c = \gamma R + 10 \), where \( \gamma = .2 \) and 10 are calibration parameters for an increase of \( c \) in \( R \). The likelihood of a TPO challenge \( \rho \) is the complementary cumulative probability of the third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge being lower than the cost of challenge, i.e., \( \rho = 1 - \Pr(\tilde{T}_0 \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1} < \gamma R + 10) = \Pr(\tilde{T}_0 \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1} - \gamma R + 10 \geq 0) \). The distribution function at high scrutiny (red dot line) second-order stochastically dominates the distribution function at low scrutiny (blue solid line). All other things being kept constant, an increase in scrutiny leads to an increase in the likelihood of challenge \( \rho \) at low litigation costs \( c \) and to a reduction in \( \rho \) at high \( c \).

Second, an increase in scrutiny updates third parties’ distribution of beliefs about the political benefits from an opportunistic challenge. If political costs for the incumbent public...
agent were downwardly biased (underestimated) by third parties ($\mu^L < \mu^H$), political benefits from an opportunist challenge would be upwardly adjusted (first-order stochastic dominance given the same standard deviation); correspondingly, if political costs for the incumbent public agent were upwardly biased (overestimated) by third parties ($\mu^L < \mu^H$), political benefits from an opportunist challenge would be downwardly adjusted (see Figure 5). The impact of an increase in scrutiny on contract features depends, therefore, on the adjustments in third parties’ beliefs. Neutral adjustments in beliefs lead to higher $\rho$, and thus higher $R^*$, for low litigation costs environments and lower $R^*$ for high litigation costs environments. Generally, an increase in scrutiny leads to public contracting efficiency (lower $\rho$, thus lower $R^*$ and $P$) with upwardly biased third-party beliefs, i.e., when the distribution of third-party beliefs about political benefits from an opportunist challenge at high scrutiny $F(\tilde{T})^H$ is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution at low scrutiny $F(\tilde{T})^L$. Likewise, high scrutiny regimes are inefficient (or not intended by the contracting parties) with downwardly biased beliefs.20

Furthermore, scrutiny increases the level of internalization of adaptation costs $K_{pu}$ by the public agent and leads, ceteris paribus, to a gain in efficiency due to lower optimal contract rigidity and contracting price. On the other hand, better informed third parties due to scrutiny may increase or decrease the likelihood of TPO. Hence, it is equivocal whether open

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20 An example where the public-private contracting parties plausibly benefited from low scrutiny and downwardly biased beliefs was reported by the Financial Times: “Royal Dutch Shell and other natural resources companies have stepped up efforts to counteract planned anti-corruption rules that would force them to disclose payments to governments in countries where they operate. The Anglo-Dutch group, Europe’s largest oil and gas company by market capitalization, has put forward a series of alternatives, arguing that the current proposals will have ‘limited impact and unclear benefits.’ The new requirements for US and EU quoted businesses are designed to highlight regimes that receive large sums from selling oil, gas, minerals and forests but then siphon off the proceeds rather than reinvest locally for public benefit. The EU has proposed a series of amendments to existing rules on transparency, including detailing payments on a project-by-project basis. The unions Competitiveness Council meets this week to agree a general approach.” See: Andrew Jack and Sylvia Pfeifer, “Shell joins push to dilute EU’s proposed anti-corruption rules,” Financial Times, February 20, 2012, p. 17.

Figure 5: This graph plots the cumulative probability (y axis) of the public agent’s beliefs about third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (x axis): blue solid line for low scrutiny states ($\mu_L = 30, \sigma_L = 20$), red dot line for high scrutiny states and neutral beliefs adjustment ($\mu_H = 30, \sigma_H = 10$), green dash line for high scrutiny states and upwardly adjusted beliefs ($\mu_H = 35, \sigma_H = 10$), and black dash-dot line for high scrutiny states and downwardly adjusted beliefs ($\mu_H = 25, \sigma_H = 10$). Upwardly adjusted beliefs (green dash line) first-order stochastically dominate neutral beliefs adjustment (red dot line). Generally, an increase in scrutiny leads to public contracting efficiency (lower $\rho$, thus lower $R^*$ and $P$) with upwardly biased third-party beliefs.

Information policies (as the case of the State of California\textsuperscript{21} or the State of Berlin\textsuperscript{22}) lead to more efficient public contracts.

\textsuperscript{21} The California State Legislatures Brown Act of 1953 guarantees the public’s right to attend and participate in meetings of local legislative bodies. The Brown Act solely applies to California city and county government agencies, boards, and councils.

The Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act of 1967 implements a provision of the California Constitution which declares that the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny, and explicitly mandates open meetings for California State agencies, boards, and commissions. The Act facilitates accountability and transparency of government activities and protects the rights of citizens to participate in state government deliberations.

The California Public Records Act of 1968 mandates disclosure of governmental records to the public upon request, unless there is a specific reason not to do so. According to Article 1 of the California Constitution due to California Proposition 59 (the Sunshine Amendment) “the people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the peoples business.”

For all California State Legislature Acts, see [http://www.legislature.ca.gov/].

\textsuperscript{22} According to the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act of the State of Berlin of July 2010, all contracts have to be made available to the public (see [http://www.berlin.de/sen/finanzen/] and Alexander Dix, 2011, “Proactive Transparency for Public Services: the Berlin Model,” [http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/10/proactive-transparency-for-public-services-the-berlin-model/] accessed December 5, 2011). The primary subject of this Act is the access to contracts on the delivery of basic public services to which the State of Berlin and private investors are parties. Additionally, in February 2011 the State of Berlin was forced by referendum to unconditionally disclose all contracts, decisions, and side agreements associated with the partial privatization of the Berlin Water Utilities and closed between the State of Berlin and the private shareholders: see “Act for the full disclosure of secret contracts for the partial privatization of the Berlin Water Utilities,” as of March 4, 2011, (GVBl. p. 82).
Proposition 3 Assuming away administrative scrutiny costs, an increase in scrutiny reduces \( R^* \) only if the internalization of adaptation costs by the public agent is larger than the increase of TPO costs due to calibration and update of beliefs by opportunist third parties.

2.7 Political and Market Structure

The model accounts for political and market structure. If the political opposition is fragmented, benefits from a challenge can go to any of the political competitors, not necessarily to the challenger who bears costs \( c \); as \( \zeta \approx 0 \) (atomized political opposition), there will be no TPO challenges, which resembles a mono-partisan or autarky system.\(^{23}\)

Analogically, a loser bidder will challenge a contract output only if the expected benefits \( \bar{T} \) are higher than litigation costs \( c \). In this case, \( \zeta \) describes the challenger’s market structure: \( \zeta = 1 \) for symmetrical Bertrand duopolies (one’s contractor losses are the gains for the other), \( \zeta < 1 \) for oligopolies, and \( \zeta \approx 0 \) for perfect competition, where an individual competitor has no incentives to challenge a public tender outcome.

2.8 Designative Specifications

In the event that over-detailed specifications were designative, i.e., pointed to one or more particular bidders and precluded a competitive bidding market, they would be a source of TPO challenge of potential collusion or favoritism.

In this case, \( E(T) \) is convex but not strictly decreasing in \( R \), i.e., expected political TPO costs \( E(R) \) first fall in \( R \) and then rise in over-specificity \( R \). If \( \lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial [E(T) + K]}{\partial R} < 0 \) holds (see Appendix B.3), then designative specificity is a sufficient condition for finite optimal equilibrium rigidity as shown in Lemma \(^\text{1}\).

3 Contract Price Under TPO

In every tender under budgetary constraints, the public agent sets—explicitly in tender information, announcements or the budget, or implicitly in internal regulations—a maximum contract price \( P_{\text{bud}} \) that she can pay the contractor. To lessen TPO, she also adjusts contract specificity and rigidity at \( R^* \). The acceptable contracting price-rigidity sets for the public

\(^{23}\) Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner does not hold councils with the Board of Ministers nor organize press meetings, and closes the doors to dialogue with the politically fragmented opposition. See: Carmen de Carlos, “El caudillaje de Cristina Kirchner (I),” *ABC*, Barcelona, February 19, 2012, pp. 36–37.
agent are below $P^{bud}$, i.e., contracts “in the budget,” subject to low TPO costs. The contractor sees specificity and rigidity $R^*$ in the tender documentation and bids accordingly. On the contractor’s side, the acceptable price-rigidity sets are those above her private adaptation costs $K_{pr}$. Therefore, the contracting area—i.e., the sets acceptable to both the public agent and the contractor—is given by price-rigidity combinations above $K_{pr}$ and below $P^{bud}$. At a given $R^*$, the minimum price required by the contractor is $P^{min}$. Figure 2 plots $E(T)$ and $K$ curves, bid and budgeted and minimum prices, optimal rigidity, and the price-rigidity contracting area.

Before the tender, especially in complex contracts and given the contracting rigidities, the public agent only has an estimation of the contractor’s adaptation costs $K_{pr}$, but does not know them with certainty. If $P^{bud}$ budgeted by the public agent is below the minimum acceptable price $P^{min} = K_{pr}$ for the contractor at a given $R^*$, then there will be no bidders at that level of $R$, or—in the case that $P^{bud}$ is not known by bidders prior to the tender—bidders will bid $P > P^{bud}$ and the tender will be annulled. Therefore, “no contract” is a possible outcome if political risks are significant and budgeted expenses are too low at a given rigidity. In this case, the tender will have to be redesigned at a lower rigidity level at the risk of higher TPO for the public agent; the budget reconsidered, creating room for third-party challenges attempting to control budget expenses; or terms negotiated after bidding, increasing TPO on suspicion of collusion.

4 Interrelation Between Third-Party and Governmental Opportunism

In this paper, our goal was to highlight third-party opportunism implications for public contracting. However, the model can also serve to analyze the impact of governmental opportunism ($G$) as a hazard to public contracts (Moszoro 2011; Troesken 1996).

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25 Scarce budgeted expenses for transport infrastructure along with excessive contract specificity and rigidity due to continuous TPO can explain the paralysis in highway development in Poland during the last decade. See “Poles repositioned,” *Project Finance Magazine*, October 23, 2010.
Proposition 4 In the presence of governmental opportunism, the private contractor will respond by seeking further specificity and rigidity $R$ and charging an additional premium $\psi(R)A$ to her private adaptation costs $K_{pr}$.

Figure 6 presents a graphical representation of an increase in equilibrium specificity and rigidity and price due to governmental opportunism.

Corollary 2 A corollary of the interrelation of third-party and governmental opportunism is that higher price $P'$ due to governmental opportunism makes the contract more vulnerable to third-party challenges, or not feasible, if the $P'$ is above the maximum price $P^{bud}$ that the public agent is willing or able to pay.

Figure 6: This graph plots expected third-party opportunism costs $E(T)$ (red solid line) and expected costs of governmental opportunism $E(G)$ (green solid-dot line) falling in rigidity and specificity $R$, and costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ (blue dash line) and adaptation costs $K$ (blue double-solid line) rising in $R$, and the U-shaped sum of $E(T) + K + E(G)$ (green dot line) as the objective function of the public agent minimizes. The contracting sets of price and rigidity are given by the area above costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ and below the price budgeted by the public agent $P^{bud}$. The equilibrium specificity and rigidity in a competitive market for public contracts with governmental opportunism rises from $R^*$ to $R'$ and the equilibrium price rises from $P^{min}$ to $P'$.

The contractor’s taking out insurance against adverse political events (e.g., governmental expropriation, confiscation of assets, or repudiation of contracts) mitigates the expected costs of governmental opportunism, but shifts up the cost of contracting $K$ by the insurance premium. In a competitive insurance market, the political risk insurance premium equals the public agent’s expropriation rents expected by the insurer $E_S(G)$, while the contractor’s
willingness to pay for political risk insurance equals her expected expropriation loss $\mathbb{E}(G)$. Political risk insurance will be beneficial for the public at large only if the political risk insurance premium, compounded now in the contract price, amounts to no more than the differential between contract prices with and without political risk insurance, i.e., $\mathbb{E}_S(G) \leq P' - P^{min}$, this differential being due to further rigidity and the contractor’s expected cost of governmental opportunism at $R'$. Political risk insurance will be cost-efficient for the contractor if the political risk insurance premium is lower or equal to her expected cost due to governmental opportunism, i.e., $\mathbb{E}_S(G) \leq \mathbb{E}(G)$.

If political risk insurance premiums are too low, contractors that face opportunistic-type governments will take out insurance, increasing the average claims. Contractors may also lower rigidity below the optimal level without political risk insurance due to moral hazard, triggering more governmental opportunism and further increasing the average claims. Advancing this result, the insurer will increase political risk premiums. If political risk insurance premiums are too high, it will not be cost-efficient for contractors of non-opportunistic-type governments to take out political risk insurance. In equilibrium without informational asymmetry on the government type, contractors will be indifferent about taking out political risk insurance. In the presence of informational asymmetry about the likelihood of governmental opportunism $\psi$, an adverse selection screening game—largely described in the literature on insurance markets—will take place, which explains high political risk insurance premiums, the existence of tiny private markets for political risk insurance, and the indispensable involvement of multilateral agencies (MLAs).

5 Applications and Supportive Evidence

The TPO model attends to standard public procurement. Nonetheless, it encompasses a wider range of public contracting praxes and can be conductive to the understanding of mechanisms in public management and efficiency. We now apply the TPO framework to specific settings to derive empirical implications.

\footnote{See, for example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a member of the World Bank Group (http://www.miga.org/; accessed July 15, 2011), or the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U.S. Government’s development finance institution (http://www.opic.gov/insurance; accessed July 15, 2011).}
5.1 Bureaucracies

Civil servants are subject to more specific and rigid contracts (e.g., regulated hiring, list of duties and responsibilities) than their peers in the private sector. A private company can hire whoever it wants and a typical employment contract may simply say “follow the instructions of your principal,” while in a public institution the process of employment of civil servants is highly formalized and procedural, and responsibilities are detailed in civil service laws and internal regulations of the agency, department, office, and section in question (Horn 1995, 20, 88, 112), and subject to independent ordinary and extraordinary controls (Horn 1995, 98). Both specific employment procedures and rigid contracts in the civil service are aimed at avoiding challenges of favoritism (Horn 1995; GAO 2003), but nonetheless result in civil servants being allowed less discretion, less initiative in bringing solutions, and lower productivity (analogical to higher price in public tenders). TPO thus provides a consistent explanation of civil service inefficiencies that is broader than the public administration view on red tape.

Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi (2007) describe the Argentine bureaucracy as a combination of constitutional protections of civil servants, relatively low wages, and low accountability to “short-lived” political public agents, which produces unresponsive bureaucrats with few incentives to invest in their own capabilities. Precisely because political public agents do not last long, TPO is not a prevalent hazard for them. The institutional adaptation that emerged is the large use of a “parallel bureaucracy,” i.e., temporary contracted profes-

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27 In this instance, bureaucrats as individuals are the private party contracting with the public agent.
28 For example, controls may be overseen by the Government Accountability Office in the USA, the Australian National Audit Office in Australia, the Tribunal de Contas da União in Brasil or the Bundesrechnungshof in Germany, to name a few.
29 According to the British Office for National Statistics (ONS), public sector productivity fell by 3.4 percent in 1997-2006, compared with a rise of 28 percent in the private sector over the same 10-year period (see Robert Watts, “Public sector pay races ahead in recession,” The Sunday Times, January 3, 2010).
31 In 1999, Federal Government wages divided by GDP per capita equaled 1.65 in Argentina, compared with 3.70 in Brazil, 3.25 in Colombia, 3.05 in Chile, and 1.99 in Mexico. See Carlson and Payne (2003).
32 The low accountability of the Argentinian administration is to a large extent due to the high turnover of political public principals: ministers, secretaries, and undersecretaries of state. For instance, the average tenure of Ministers of Finance in 1950-1989 was 1 year, compared with 2.4 years in developed countries and 2.0 in developing countries (Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi 2007, 165).
sionals, better paid, more responsive to their principals, under a more flexible regime than permanent bureaucrats, and whose appointments are left to the discretion of the principal public agent in office (Iacoviello and Tommasi 2002; Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi 2007). Thereby, political public agents in Argentina blend permanent bureaucracy with temporary bureaucrats who respond more flexibly and efficiently.

5.2 Fixed-Price vs. Cost-Plus Contracts

In theory, fixed-price contracts are preferable when the adverse selection problem decreases relative to the moral hazard problem (e.g., in the procurement of standardized goods and services, or in projects involving a low level of informational asymmetry between the contracting parties), while cost-plus procurement is preferable when the adverse selection problem increases relative to the moral hazard problem (i.e., when uncertainties related to technological requirements are unknown and bigger than the inefficiencies arising from incomplete monitoring and insulation of the contractor from cost overruns).34

In practice, cost-plus contracts have been criticized by the administration, lawmakers, and taxpayers for frequent and substantial cost overruns in government contracting. A GAO (2008) study of 95 major defense acquisition projects found cost overruns of 26 percent, totaling $295 billion over the life of the projects. Cost-plus contracts are more flexible to adaptation, but also subject to potential abuse and shading (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder 2011). The Presidential Memorandum of March 4, 2009, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Contracting, explicitly stated that “there shall be a preference for fixed-price type contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts shall be used only when circumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract.”36

Procurement laws normally allow public agents the design of public procurements based...
on a menu of price, technical, and quality criteria. Public agents are given discretion regarding
the choice of criteria and the weights of those criteria in the final decision scoring. However,
there is a strong affinity for the price criterion when accountability and scrutiny, and attached
to them political hazards are high. In France, only 2 percent of all public tenders include soft
clauses. In Poland in 2004, 29 percent of the public tenders where assigned based on the
lowest price bidder single criterion. In 2010, that figure jumped to 91 percent. According to
analysts (Jarzyński 2011), this preference for fixed-price bidding was the result of Poland’s
entering the European Union in May 2004. The availability of EU funds increased the amount
of money assigned through public procurement, but also increased the frequency, complexity,
and profundity of controls. Therefore, public agents preferred to include technical and quality
parameters in specifications and rely on the more “objective, clear, and accountable”—less
contestable—price criterion for bid selection to avoid political risks.

Fixed-price contracts do not provide adaptable risk-sharing mechanisms and may lead
to an unintended increase in government payments. In the presence of closer third-party
oversight and fear of TPO, public agents will prefer fixed-price contracts in settings where
cost-plus contracts could prove to be more efficient.

5.3 Public-Private Partnerships

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are public service businesses operated under long-term
agreements with private providers. Beside fiscal motives, they are aimed at gaining efficiency
from the private sector’s technical and managerial advantage through innovation and flexi-
bility. Flexibility, however, makes PPPs vulnerable to third-party challenges (higher $\rho$). To
limit the scope of ex post challenges from third parties, public agents control outputs through
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), i.e., measures under which the contractors are evaluated.

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37 See: [http://www.ngo.pl/x/686690](http://www.ngo.pl/x/686690)
38 See also Tony Purton, “The case for a return to ‘cost plus’,” *Defense Viewpoints*, March 24,
2007, [http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/the-case-for-a-return-to cost-plus](http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/the-case-for-a-return-to cost-plus) (accessed
July 10, 2011). Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002) report costs underestimation in 9 out of 10 transport in-
frastructure projects: actual costs were 45 percent higher than planned in rail projects, 34 percent in tunnels
and bridges projects, and 20 percent in road projects.
39 As stated in the Presidential Memorandum (op. cit.), “reports by agency Inspectors General, the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), and other independent reviewing bodies have shown that non-competitive
and cost-reimbursement contracts have been misused, resulting in wasted taxpayer resources, poor contractor
performance, and inadequate accountability for results” and “improved contract oversight could reduce such
sums significantly” (emphasis added).
At the same time, KPIs constitute a signal for the public at large that the service, although privately provided, remains publicly accountable. KPIs are thus crucial to curb third parties’ ability to challenge PPPs. Nevertheless, the failure of many (potential) PPPs can be rooted in high adaptation costs $K$ imposed on private contractors.

A number of Australian studies of private investment in infrastructure reached the conclusion that, in most cases, the PPPs were inferior—overall more expensive for the public or delivered lower quality of services—than the standard model of public procurement based on competitively tendered construction of publicly-owned assets. One response by public agents to these negative findings was the development of formal procedures for \textit{ex ante} assessment of PPPs using the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and Value-for-Money (VfM) methodologies, i.e., introducing more contractual \textit{ex ante} specificity and contractual costs.$^{[40]}$

In 2009, the Treasury of New Zealand, in response to inquiries by the new National Party government, released a report on PPPs that came to the conclusion that “there is little reliable empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of PPPs” and that “the advantages of PPPs must be weighed against the \textit{contractual complexities and rigidities} they entail.”$^{[41]}$

In the presence of TPO, public agents will pursue private provision of public goods only in projects where expected gains from contract flexibility and better private management offset the increase of costs of compliancy with \textit{ex ante} cost-benefit assessment and \textit{ex post} KPIs.

5.4 External Consultants and Certification of Contractors

The engagement of independent consultants (e.g., multilateral agencies, international advisers, especially in countries with weak legal systems) strengthens the objectivity of procurement processes and prevents third-party challenges that cooperation between public agents and private contractors has crossed the line and become collusion.

Moszoro and Krzyzanowska (2008) report the employment of external consultants in the city of Warsaw in the pre-procurement planning phase when it wanted to introduce novel PPP contracts: firstly, to overcome the lack of expertise in complex contracting (to reduce $K$) and, secondly and most importantly, to “safeguard the city authorities against complaints

$^{[40]}$ See, for example, the Department of Treasury and Finance of Victoria’s (2001) technical note on PSC.

and criticism by subsequent administrations.” While the city authorities could have designed the tender process in-house, they seem to have outsourced it to reduce TPO. The use of external consultants, however, came at a cost: PLN 10 million ($3.2 million), i.e., 1.2 percent of the estimated budget for those projects.

Similarly, certain public tenders require certification of contractors and sub-contractors, increasing contract specificity and the price of the tender. In May 2010, a public procurement for the “Canal Safety and Drainage Improvements Project” in Antioch, Pittsburg, Bay Point, Clyde, and Walnut Creek (California), tendered by the Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, was objected to by JMB Construction.\(^\text{42}\) JMB Construction argued that the apparent low bidder Con-Quest Contractors included a non-certified subcontractor. According to Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, the relevance of the works the alleged sub-contract would provide was minimal for the project overall; however, the challenger argued that the inclusion of a non-certified subcontractor allowed Con-Quest Contractors to bid a lower price ($756,000 compared with JMB Construction’s $852,000, i.e., 11 percent cheaper) than if it had included only certified subcontractors.\(^\text{43}\)

Furthermore, if required “red-tape” certificates exclude qualified bidders and prevent competitive bidding, the market structure will become more oligopolistic and additional dead-weight inefficiencies will add to the final equilibrium price.

In both cases—the use of external consultants and certification of contractors—the implicit aim is to lessen the likelihood of TPO challenge \(\rho\). There is a trade-off for the public agent between lower TPO hazards and additional contracting costs \(K\) of external consultants and certification. The public agent will employ external consultants and certification when additional contracting costs \(K\) incurred are lower than price gains in contract flexibility due to lower \(\mathbb{E}(T)\) and \(R^*\).

### 5.5 Efficient Small Communities and Authoritarian Regimes

Small local governments (towns, counties) can be more efficient in public contracting than larger governments (metropolises, states). Due to the lower value of the contracts compared with larger governments, the benefits from political challenge are relatively low. Thus, the


\(^{43}\) Based on an interview held in May 2010 with a Contra Costa Water District engineer.
likelihood of challenge is lower and subsequently potential TPO costs are lower. The public agent can therefore engage in more discretionary contracts and incur lower transaction costs.

Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010) present a study covering 3,825 Italian municipalities and 27,537 auctions, where an increase in the mayor’s tenure of one term is associated with fewer bidders per auction (−23.28 percent), a higher probability that the winner is local (+3.20 percent) and that the same firm is awarded repeated auctions (+25.52 percent), i.e., more discretionary contracting (lower $R^*$) correlated with longer tenure. They also find evidence that a high level of heterogeneity within the government coalition reduces the possibility of favoritism in shaping the procurement process, that less “colluded” mayors are more likely to be reelected and survive longer, and that citizens and competitors are more likely to closely monitor large public projects.

Two reasons can be given why mayors with longer tenure show a low concern about TPO and contract discretionarily. First, the Italian electoral system in municipalities is a simple majority regime. Consequently, in small municipalities, high political contestability (low $\zeta$) results in dispersed voting and a relative advantage for incumbent mayors. Second, procurement protests in Italy go through courts, where penalties for breaking procurement laws are rarely enforced (low $\tau$). When $K$ increases in $R$ more rapidly than $\mathbb{E}(T)$ decreases in $R$, or when $\mathbb{E}(T)$ are irrelevant due to lack of political contestability (as seems to be the case in Italian municipalities), the outcome is discretionary procurement.

Authoritarian regimes, where the likelihood of challenging the incumbent public agent is low, can contract public works more discretionarily and, thus, cheaper and quicker. The lack of chances for TPO can help to explain the rapid development of infrastructure in Paraguay during the Stroessner regime. Molinas et al. (2006, 12–13) report the significant ability of the

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44 Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010, 26–27) argue that mayors’ time in office leads progressively to a long-term relation (“collusion”) with a few favored bidders, and propose two interpretations: one based on favoritism and bribes in procurement, and another based on a learning process of by mayors about the quality of contractors and a preference for higher-quality contractors.

45 If $m$ is the population and $n$ the number of candidates, a candidate needs $m/n + 1$ votes to win the election.

46 During the period 2005-2008, the Italian central purchasing authority CONSIP made 4,095 random inspections on the ex post renegotiations of procurement contracts for goods and services, and found a total of 1,455 contractual infringements. Only 4 percent of the associated penalties were paid (Coviello and Gagliarducci 2010, 27). In Italy in 2009, the average waiting time for a bid protest first instance hearing was 18 months (European Commission 2011). Furthermore, anecdotally, then it takes on average more than 10 years for juries to come to a verdict on bid protests. How public contracting can actually take place in an environment in which penalties are seldom paid remains a subject of future research.
regime “to reap the benefits offered by long-term economic opportunities. (...) [Development programs were] possible because of the intertemporal ‘cooperation’ of the key actors (the government, the Party, and the Armed Forces). The adaptation of the development model to allow for increasing integration with Brazil would have been unlikely under short-lived governments like the ones characterizing the post-Chaco war period (1936-1954). During that 18-year period, there were 12 different presidents, and political volatility prevented an adaptation to changing economic environments. (...) During the 1960s and the 1970s, Paraguay built roads, silos and, most importantly, the biggest dam in the world, the Itaipú Hydro-electric Dam, built jointly with Brazil. The long-term growth strategy turned out to be effective. During the 1960s, real GDP growth was 4.2 percent. During the 1970s, Paraguay had one of the highest growth rates in the region, with real GDP increasing at 8 percent over the decade.” That ability to move policy decisively and effectively by an authoritarian regime, however, also funneled most of the benefits from this fast development period to a few contractors and subcontractors—companies owned by the dictator’s followers (Fogel 1993, 16).

5.6 Privatizations of Government-Owned Companies

Privatizations of government-owned companies[^47] are usually subject to clauses of commitment by the private acquirer concerning labor retention, modernization processes, future investments and other social sensitive issues. On the one hand, rigid privatization contracts (high $R^*$) take place in the fear of TPO challenges to the incumbent public agent by labor unions, the local community, and the political opposition. In order to minimize TPO challenges to privatizations, public agents embed clauses and golden shares in privatization contracts that allow them to limit “cream skimming” (Kolderie 1986) and the discretion of the private investor. On the other hand, such privatization clauses limit the company’s governance and, consequently, lower its value (analogical to a high price in a public procurement). If the revenue to the public budget from privatization is low, the public agent can be accused of collusion with the private agent or of “selling off the family silver” (Kolderie 1986). The corollary is that privatizations’ aftermath regarding price and efficiency appears

[^47]: PPP and privatization differ in that the former is a transfer to the private sector of a right (which may or may not come with a physical asset) to perform the public function, while the latter usually refers to the sale of an asset which is not necessarily idiosyncratic to the public sector (e.g., liquor stores in Pennsylvania).
to be a sell-off from a government’s valuation standpoint and rigid from a private managerial perspective.

6 Concluding Remarks

TPO theory combines political hazards and transaction costs to explain apparent inefficiencies in public contracts. High *ex ante* payment volatility or *ex post* flexibility in implementation may trigger drawbacks, leading to contract failure or costly adaptation by the public official, whether in terms of time or political career. A paramount conclusion of our analysis is that public contracts cannot be directly compared to private contracts. Instead, they can only be compared to analogous public contracts, and should pass Williamson’s “remediableness criterion,” which holds that “an extant mode of organization for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be efficient” (Williamson 1999, 316; the emphasis is original), to attest to their efficiency.

The fact that public contracting is more expensive and rigid than private contracting, however, does not mean that transferring those activities to the public sector would reduce political risks and hence make them more efficient. Public procurement is used for “hard” agency problems where consumers cannot be trusted and “when bureaucracies work poorly, [but] consumer choice works worse” (Prendergast 2003, 930–933). Not only, as Williamson (1999, 320) discusses, do certain transactions have special needs for probity and require the security of the State, but the privatization of public functions itself involves TPO hazards, making them less preferable for public agents than public contracting itself.

In this paper, we have analyzed public procurement in a variety of environments to show that much of its outer features can be understood as political adaptations to the fundamental hazard of third-party opportunism prevalent in public contracting.
### Appendix A  Notation

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<th>Formula</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>$\leq I$</td>
<td>Public agent’s rents from penalties or expropriation</td>
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<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of challenge and litigation for third parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}(G)$</td>
<td>$\psi A$</td>
<td>Expected costs of governmental opportunism</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}_S(G)$</td>
<td>$T_0 \rho \tau$</td>
<td>Expropriation rents expected by the insurer</td>
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<td>$\mathbb{E}(T)$</td>
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<td>Expected third-party opportunism costs</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$I$</td>
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<td>Sunk investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$K_{pr} + K_{pu}$</td>
<td>Adaptation costs, compound of costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ and costs borne by the public agent $K_{pu}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price bid by the contractor</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P'$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price bid by the contractor beset by governmental opportunism</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_{bud}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price budgeted by the public agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_{min}$</td>
<td>$\geq K_{pr}$</td>
<td>Minimum acceptable price by the contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Third parties binary decision variable: $q = 1$ when a contract protest is placed; $q = 0$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^*$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optimal contract specificity and rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R'$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optimal contract specificity and rigidity at governmental opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_0$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political costs of third-party opportunism at discretionary contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tilde{T}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Third parties’ benefits from an opportunistic challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tilde{T}_0$</td>
<td>$\sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$</td>
<td>Distribution of third parties’ beliefs about political benefits of opportunism at discretionary contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^L, \alpha^H$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Level of internalization of contracting costs by the public agent under low and high scrutiny regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta^L, \beta^H$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Types of informed third parties under low and high scrutiny regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu^L, \mu^H$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean of third parties’ beliefs of political benefits from opportunistic challenges under low and high scrutiny regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood of governmental opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>$\Pr(\tilde{T} &gt; c)$</td>
<td>Likelihood of third-party opportunistic challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood of success of third-party opportunistic challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political (market) concentration</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>U.S. General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Multi-Lateral Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO</td>
<td>Third-Party Opportunism</td>
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</table>
Appendix B  Proofs

Appendix B.1  Proof of Proposition 1

Third parties’ choice of opportunistic challenge $q$ is such that $q = 1$ iff expected returns to TPO are positive, i.e., $\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau(R) > c(R)$. From the public agent’s perspective $\rho$ is the expected value of the random realization of $q$:

$$\mathbb{E}(q \mid R) \equiv \Pr \left[ \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau(R) - c(R) > 0 \right] \equiv \rho$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Given that $\frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial c}{\partial R} > 0$,

$$\frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} = f \left[ \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau(R) - c(R) \right] \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial c}{\partial R} \right) \leq 0 \hspace{1cm} \text{[3]}
$$

Appendix B.2  Proof of Proposition 2

Let $F(\tilde{T}_0) \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ be the twice differentiable normal distribution of $\tilde{T}_0$ with mean $\mu$ and standard deviation $\sigma$. From the linear transformation property of normal distributions, let $f[\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau - c; \zeta \tau \mu - c, (\zeta \tau)^2 \sigma^2]$.

$\mathbb{E}(T)$ decreases in $R$—From Proposition 1:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R} = T_0 \left( \tau \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} + \rho \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} \right) < 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$\mathbb{E}(T)$ is locally convex in $R$:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R^2} = T_0 \left( \tau \frac{\partial^2 \rho}{\partial R^2} + 2 \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} + \rho \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

Differentiating Equation [3] with respect to $R$:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \rho}{\partial R^2} = \frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial R} \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial c}{\partial R} \right)^2 + f(\cdot) \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} - \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial R^2} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Replacing Equation [6] in Equation [5],

$$\frac{\partial^2 \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R^2} \begin{cases} \geq 0 & \text{for} \quad \tau f(\cdot) \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} - \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial R^2} \right) + 2 \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} + \rho \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} \\ < 0 & \text{otherwise (locally concave)} \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

$\mathbb{E}(T)$ is globally convex in $R$—From Assumption 1 and Proposition 1:

$$\lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R} < \lim_{R \to \infty} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial^2 \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R^2} > \lim_{R \to \infty} \frac{\partial^2 \mathbb{E}(T)}{\partial R^2} = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)
Appendix B.3 Proof of Lemma 1

For \( \lim_{R \to 0} \frac{\partial[E(T)+K]}{\partial R} \geq 0 \), \( R^* = 0 \) (e.g., relational contracting). Otherwise, since \( \lim_{R \to 0} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \) and \( \lim_{R \to \infty} \frac{\partial E(T)}{\partial R} \) \( R^* \in (0, \infty) : R^* = \arg \min_R [E(T(R)) + K(P, R)] \) and \( \frac{\partial[E(T(R'))+K(R')]}{\partial R} = 0 \).

Appendix B.4 Proof of Corollary 1

This proof follows from Lemma 1 and the discussion provided in the text.

Appendix B.5 Proof of Proposition 3

(a) Let \( \alpha^L, \alpha^H \in (0, 1) \) be the level of internalization of contracting costs by the public agent, where \( \alpha^L < \alpha^H \), \( \alpha^L \) represents low internalization for low scrutiny states of the world and \( \alpha^H \) represents high internalization for high scrutiny states of the world, and \( \alpha^L \) \( K \) are third-party contracting and enforcement costs accounting for scrutiny

(b) An increase in scrutiny from \( \alpha^L \) to \( \alpha^H \) leads to an increase in the internalization of direct and indirect expenses by the public agent, i.e., \( \frac{\partial \alpha^H K}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial \alpha^L K}{\partial R} = (\alpha^H - \alpha^L) \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} > 0 \)

(c) In comparative statics, if Proposition 2 and Assumption 3 hold, and for any given \( K_{pr} \), an increase in the level of internalization of contracting costs by the public agent \( (\alpha^L \rightarrow \alpha^H) \) leads to a decrease in the optimal rigidity \( (R^L > R^H) \), thus—\textit{ceteris paribus}—lower \( R^* \) leads to lower \( K_{pr} \) and lower \( P_{min} \) due to monotonicity and strict convexity of \( E(T) \) in \( R \)

(d) Let \( \beta^L, \beta^H \in (0, 1) \) be the types of informed third parties from scrutiny, where \( \beta^L \) represents low informed types for low scrutiny states of the world and \( \beta^H \) represents high informed types for high scrutiny states of the world, and \( \rho \beta \) is the likelihood of third-party challenges accounting for scrutiny

\[
\frac{\partial E(T)|\beta^H}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial E(T)|\beta^L}{\partial R} = T_0[\tau \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} + \rho \beta^H \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R}] - T_0[\tau \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} + \rho \beta^L \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R}] = (\beta^H - \beta^L) \rho T_0 \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R}
\]

(f) Depending on the type of informed third parties, \( \rho \beta \) may increase in scrutiny \( (\beta^L < \beta^H \), i.e., downwardly biased third parties) or decrease in scrutiny \( (\beta^L > \beta^H \), i.e., upwardly biased third parties)

(g) If \( \beta^L > \beta^H \), every increase in scrutiny leads to a decrease in \( R^* \) and \( P_{min} \)

(h) If \( \beta^L < \beta^H \), an increase in scrutiny leads to a decrease in \( R^* \) only if \( \alpha^H - \alpha^L \) \( \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} > (\beta^H - \beta^L) \rho T_0 \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} \)

Appendix B.6 Proof of Proposition 4

Let \( I \) be sunk investments and \( A \) be the rents of the public agent from expropriation (where \( A = I \) represents total expropriation and \( A < I \) represents partial expropriation) and \( \psi \) the likelihood of governmental opportunism of appropriating \( A \). Expected costs of governmental opportunism equal \( E(G) = \psi(R)A \), where \( \psi \) is assumed to decrease in contract specificity and rigidity \( \frac{\partial \psi}{\partial R} < 0 \).
For any $\psi > 0$, the higher sunk investments $I$ are, the higher possible expropriation rents $A$ and expected costs of governmental opportunism $E(G)$ will be, ergo the private contractor will demand higher contract specificity and rigidity $R' > R^*$ and higher final price $P' > P_{\min}$.

Appendix B.7  Proof of Corollary 2

Proof provided in the text.
References


Iacoviello, Mercedes, and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. “Diagnóstico institucional de sistemas de servicio civil: caso Argentina.” In *Diálogo Regional de Políticas*. Buenos Aires: [n.a.].


