« The Dark And Bright Sides Of Renegotiation: An Application To Transport Concession Contracts »

6 mai 2010

Julie de Brux, 2010,Utilities Policy, 18 (2010), pp.77-85

Abstract: Les renégociations des partenariats public-privé font l’objet d’une attention soutenue dans le cadre des théories des contrats. Nées de stratégies opportunistes, et visant à s’approprier des rentes, elles sont vues comme un écueil à éviter, puisqu’elles génèrent des pertes de surplus social.

Même dans les cas où elles visent à mettre en place des investissements non contractualisables ex-ante, ces renégociations sont modélisées via un processus par lequel les parties maximisent leur surplus individuel de court-terme.

Cet article propose une vision alternative. Au travers de deux études de cas, nous montrons que les renégociations peuvent être coopératives. Ces études de cas suggèrent que lorsque les parties accordent de l’importance à leurs relations bilatérales présentes et futures, elles sont plus enclines à trouver des solutions soutenables et avantageuses pour toutes les parties au contrat. Même en agissant pour leur intérêt propre à l’étape de la renégociation, les parties cherchent à maximiser le surplus total. De cette façon, elles renforcent la pérennité de leurs relations.

Abstract: Renegotiations of public–private partnerships have recently been the subject of much attention. Economists regularly analyse them through the lens of ‘hold up’ theories. According to these models, renegotiations are a problem to be avoided: renegotiations become opportunistic because agents are self-interested, and they use renegotiation to seek rents. As a result, renegotiating destroys social surplus. Even when renegotiations occur to fill in the blanks of the contracts, and implement investments that had not been contracted maximise their short run individual benefit. This paper sets out an alternative and new view. Through two case studies, we show that renegotiations may be cooperative, contrary to the conventional view. We find that when parties give an important value to their present and future bilateral relationships, they are prone to find solutions that are sustainable and profitable for both parties. Even acting according to their own self-interest, at the stage of renegotiation, parties try to maximise joint utility. In this way, they reinforce the durability of their relationship. ex ante, they typically predict a process by which parties use renegotiations to maximise their short run individual benefit.

This paper sets out an alternative and new view. Through two case studies, we show that renegotiations may be cooperative, contrary to the conventional view. We find that when parties give an important value to their present and future bilateral relationships, they are prone to find solutions that are sustainable and profitable for both parties. Even acting according to their own self-interest, at the stage of renegotiation, parties try to maximise joint utility. In this way, they reinforce the durability of their relationship.