Riccardo Marchi Adani, Paola Valbonesi
(University of Verona, University of Padova)
Wednesday, January 11th, 2017
6:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.
IAE de Paris – 8 bis rue la Croix-Jarry, 75013 Paris
Building A – Room A4
Riccardo Marchi Adani (University of Verona)
Abstract: Scoring rule auctions (SRAs) can be a powerful mechanism to procure complex works or services, when quality matters. However, given the buyer’s discretion in the design of SRAs, favouritism can arise as a drawback. In this paper we empirically document potential favouritism in an original dataset of 196 SRAs for the procurement of canteen services in Italy over the period 2009-2013. We then sketch a simple model highlighting how an SRA with multidimensional quality can be distorted to favour the incumbent bidder winning the competition. Finally design and run a new empirical test to verify our theoretical result. We find that SRAs can be distorted to favour the incumbent bidder, and that the victory of the incumbent is associated with less competition and higher prices.
Short bio: Riccardo Marchi Adani received his Ph.D. on April 2016 from the University of Verona. He is actually in Paris, at the Chaire EPPP, thanks to a grant from Unicredit. His main research interest is in the study of design and pathologies of the public procurement. He is especially interested in the use of multidimensional auctions as a tool to obtain quality at the best value for money in a period of scarce public resources and in the study of the procurement in the health sector.