Jean-Etienne de Bettignies

(Queen’s School of Business)

When is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable? (avec David T. Robinson, Duke Fuqua)

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Lieu: IAE de Paris, 21 rue Broca, 75005 Paris – Salle du Conseil (7ème Etage)
Date: Jeudi, 27 Février, 2014 – 16:0018:00
Short bio: Dr. Jean de Bettignies is Associate Professor, and Commerce ’64 Fellow in Managerial Economics, at Queen’s School of Business. His research examines applications of contract theory to economics of organization, entrepreneurial and corporate finance, and public policy. His work is published or forthcoming in top tier academic journals including Management Science; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Journal of Industrial Economics; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; and International Journal of Industrial Organization. Jean received his Ph.D. and his M.B.A. from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago in 2001. He also holds a B.Sc. in Economics from the London School of Economics and an M.A. in Economics from the Université Catholique de Louvain. Prior to joining Queen’s in the summer of 2007, Jean was Assistant Professor at the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia, where he was nominated (2006) for the MBA Teaching Excellence Award.
Abstract: We study a model in which corporate social responsibility arises as a response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms generate profits and in doing so create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may or may not be socially optimal. Governments may endogenously choose suboptimal levels of regulation if they face lobbying pressure from companies. Companies can, in turn, hire socially responsible employees who enjoy taking actions to ameliorate the negative spillovers. Because firms can capture part of the rent created by allowing socially responsible employees to correct social ills, in some settings they find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then capture the surplus associated with being “good citizens” in the face of bad regulation.

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