Posts de Stéphane Saussier
L’efficacité des contrats de partenariat en France : Une première évaluation quantitative
Numéro: 2012-6 L’efficacité des contrats de partenariat en France : Une première évaluation quantitative Phuong Tra Tran et Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP) Abstract: Ce travail a été réalisé par la chaire Economie des Partenariats Public Privé de l’Institut d’Administration des Entreprises de Paris Sorbonne, avec le soutien de la Mission d’appui aux Partenariats Public Privé (MaPPP). Il…
Lire la suiteWater under the Bridge: City Size, Bargaining Power, Prices and Franchise Renewals in the Provision of Water
Numéro: 2012-5 Water under the Bridge: City Size, Bargaining Power, Prices and Franchise Renewals in the Provision of water Eshien Chong (Chaire EPPP), Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP), Brian S. Silverman (Rotman Business School, U. of Toronto) Abstract: Since Williamson’s 1976 study of franchise bidding for natural monopolies, there has been extensive debate concerning the degree to which…
Lire la suiteTransposition de la « Directive défense » : Abistis, dulces caricæ?
Transposition de la « Directive défense » : Abistis, dulces caricæ?
La garantie de la souveraineté de l’Etat implique l’indépendance nationale. En 1958, le Constituant a confié la garantie de l’indépendance nationale au Président de la République[2], comme pour mieux souligner les liens étroits qui unissent l’indépendance nationale et la souveraineté de l’Etat. La République française ne saurait être obligée par une quelconque norme qui lui serait exogène[3] ou commandée par un Etat tiers et il est de la responsabilité du chef de l’Etat d’y veiller.
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The political side of public utilities: how opportunistic behavior and yardstick competition shape water prices in Austria
Numéro: 2012-4 The political side of public utilities: how opportunistic behavior and yardstick competition shape water prices in Austria Michael Klien (Chaire EPPP) Abstract: This paper studies the effect of politics on water prices in Austria. When public utilities are under political control, price setting may be affected by political incentives. Besides classical theories like the…
Lire la suiteCorporatization and the behavior of public firms: how shifting control rights affects political interference
Numéro: 2012-3 Corporatization and the behavior of public firms: how shifting control rights affects political interference Michael Klien (Chaire EPPP) Abstract: As an alternative to privatization, corporatization implies a shift of control rights from politicians to managers while ownership remains public. Even though corporatized firms are fairly common – both in Europe and the US – little…
Lire la suiteTiming tariff increases over the electoral cycles : an empirical investigation of political decision making
Numéro: 2012-2 Timing tariff increases over the electoral cycles : an empirical investigation of political decision making Michael Klien (chaire EPPP) Abstract: This paper uses data on municipal tariff decisions to analyze the effect of elections on policy choices. Like existing research, the results confirm the existence of a political cycle in fiscal policy. More importantly, this paper…
Lire la suite(Potential) Number of Bidders and Winning Bids Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model
Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy, 2013, Volume 47, Number 1, p.17-34, (2013)
In this paper we investigate the relationship between cost and number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database on 806 calls for tender on local bus transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the few empirical tests of a crucial theoretical issue, has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to participate (e.g. France). More precisely, our results point out that the allotment of an urban transport network may be a source of significant costs reductions.
Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract
Industrial and Corporate Change, 2012, Vol 21 (4), 811-836
In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner’s reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements.
Lire la suiteGestion publique ou privée ? Un benchmarking des services d’eau en France
Numéro: 2012-1 Gestion publique ou privée ? Un benchmarking des services d’eau en France Par Aude Le Lannier et Simon Porcher Abstract: Nous utilisons une méthode d’Analyse par Enveloppe de Données (DEA) ainsi qu’une méthode d’Analyse par Frontière Stochastique (SFA) pour mesurer l’efficacité relative de 177 services d’eau en France, en 2009. Ces services peuvent être gérés…
Lire la suiteJulie DE BRUX
Renegotiation and performance in public-private contractual arrangements. An economic analysis Novembre 2011
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