Posts de Stéphane Saussier
Interfirm Cooperation in Strategic Relationships: The Role of Formal Contract
Numéro: 2010-2 Interfirm Cooperation in Strategic Relationships: The Role of Formal Contract Jean Beuve (Chaire EPPP ) and Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP) Abstract: In this paper, we use a large database of more than 3700 strategic relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by…
Lire la suiteThe Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts
Numéro: 2010-1 The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts Julie de Brux (Chaire EPPP & Vinci) Abstract: Renegotiations of public-private partnerships have recently been the subject of much attention. Economists regularly analyse them through the lens of ‘hold up’ theories. According to these models, renegotiations are a problem to be avoided:…
Lire la suiteMiguel AMARAL
Modes d’Organisation et Performances : Le Cas du Transport Public Urbain en Europe Novembre 2009
Lire la suite« Appels d’offres concurrentiels et avantage au sortant, une étude empirique du secteur du transport public urbain en France »
Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2009, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 2009, Vol. 127, 1-19, sous presse. Abstract: Cet article porte sur les déterminants de la reconduction des contrats de services publics attribués par appels d’offres concurrentiels. Partant de la constatation que ces contrats changent très rarement de mains, on s’interroge sur les raisons de cette stabilité des prestataires de services…
Lire la suite« Intensité concurrentielle et transparence des appels d’offres »
Article paru dans la revue Transport/Environnement/Circulation, Septembre 2009, N°203, 41-43.
Lire la suiteContract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Axel GAUTIER (HEC-ULg and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain) & Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris 1 Sorbonne)
In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm by the mean of a fixed-term regulatory contract. This contract specifies the duties of the firm and a financial compensation. When it expires, a new contract is awarded, possibly to a different operator. There are three types of commonly used contracts: cost-plus, gross cost and net cost contracts. In this paper, we analyse the incentives for the operator to reduce its cost. These incentives come from both the profit maximization during the current contract and the perspective of contract renewal. In our model, the amount of cost-reducing effort depends on the contract type and the time remaining till contract expiration. We use a sample of 124 French urban public transport networks covering the period 1995-2002 to test our predictions. Our proxy for the cost reducing effort is technical efficiency. The data largely confirm the importance of contract type on performances and the incentive effect of contract renewal.
« Contracting with Governments » Advances in Strategic Management, 26, 487-522
Eric Brousseau et Stéphane Saussier, 2009, « Contracting with Governments », Advances in Strategic Management, 26, 487-522
Lire la suite« Le recours aux contrats de partenariat dans la défense en France »
Résumé : Les contrats de partenariat peinent à se développer dans la Défense en France, en dépit de nombreuses impulsions politiques depuis 2002.
Lire la suiteLa dimension spatiale dans le choix des collectivités de déléguer leurs services publics : le cas de la distribution d’eau en France
Résumé: En utilisant une base de données sur les choix organisationnels effectués par les collectivités locales en France dans le secteur de l’eau, nous montrons l’intérêt de l’introduction de la dimension spatiale dans le débat sur les partenariats public-privé.
Corruption, Collusion, and other Strategic Behaviors: The Case of Local Transport in London and France
Abstract: In many countries, governments are pushing for the introduction of competition in the organization of public services and more broadly in public procurement.
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