Documents de Travail

Numéro: 2011-6 Reputation and the Dynamics of Contractual Incompleteness. Claudine Desrieux and Jean Beuve Abstract: This article examines why in some cases parties are willing to sign agreements that are left intentionally incomplete with regard to future contingencies, and why they prefer to choose more complete agreements in some other situations. More complete contracts allow avoiding ex-post…

Numéro: 2011-5 Relational Contract and Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness. Experimental Evidence. Jean Beuve and Claudine Desrieux Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the interaction between relational contracting and endogenous contractual incompleteness. To account for contractual relationships with perspective of future interactions, we design an infinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players. In this experiment, the probability of continuation and…

Numéro: 2011-4 Renegotiations, Discretion and Contract Renewals, An Empirical Analysis of Public-Private Agreements Jean Beuve, Julie De Brux et Stéphane Saussier Abstract:This paper studies how renegotiations influence ongoing contractual relationships. By using an original dataset of 252 expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we explore the link between  renegotiations and subsequent contract renewals.…

Numéro: 2011-3 Abstract : We analyse bidder collusion in public procurement. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels. Using public information on convicted bid-rigging schemes taken from the decisions of the French Competition Authority, we have constructed an original database on 33 different cartels operating in 114 public work tenders. Our empirical work tackles the question of external cartel stability.…

Numéro: 2011-2 Design Contractuel et Renégociations: Impacts sur l’Efficacité de la Concurrence par Comparaison Aude Le Lannier (IAE Paris, Chaire EPPP & GREGOR) Résumé: Les modèles de concurrence par comparaison supposent que le régulateur dispose d’une capacité d’engagement totale. Cela se traduit par la signature de contrats rigides et non renégociés. Or, on constate que c’est rarement…

Numéro: 2011-1 Enforcement of Yardstick Contracts & Consistency in Performance Rankings : An Application to the Water Industry in England and Wales Aude Le Lannier (IAE Paris, Chaire EPPP & GREGOR) Abstract: This paper aims to determine the extent to which enforcement difficulties of yardstick competition implemented by the regulator of the UK water and sewerage sector…

Numéro: 2010-9 Enchères ou négociations dans les marchés publics: Une analyse empirique Eshien Chong (ADIS, Paris 11), Carine Staropoli (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Anne Yvrande-Billon (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne). Résumé:Un acheteur public doit-il attribuer un marché public au moyen d’une enchère ou par la négociation directe ? Pour traiter de cette question, nous examinons trois déterminants pouvant influencer…

Numéro: 2010-8 Monitoring Policy and Organizational Forms in Franchised Chains Thierry Pénard (CREM, Université de Rennes I), Emmanuel Raynaud (INRA & CES, Université Paris I) and Stéphane Saussier (IAE Sorbonne Grad School) Abstract: Franchising is nowadays a prominent way to organize the distribution sector. While previous literature suggests that monitoring issues are a critical determinant of…

Numéro: 2010-7 Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model Miguel Amaral (CES, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Stéphane Saussier (IAE Sorbonne Grad School) and Anne Yvrande-Billon (CES, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne) Abstract : In this paper the authors investigate the relationship between cost and number of bidders for local transportation…

Numéro: 2010-5 Hazards in Transfering Knowledge and Contractual Architecture: The Case of Payment Schemes in Technology Licensing Agreements Christian Bessy (IDHE, CNRS), Eric Brousseau (Economix, Université Paris X) & Stéphane Saussier (IAE Paris) Abstract: This article provides an empirical assessment of payment schemes implemented in technology licensing agreements. Following a new institutional and resource-based view analysis, we…