Documents de Travail
Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence
Numéro: 2010-4 Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence Eshien Chong (ADIS – Paris 11), Carine Staropoli (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Anne Yvrande-Billon (CES, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne) Abstract: The relative efficiency of auctions and negotiations is still a puzzle in the literature. While auctions are the prescribed procedures and the most used ones for…
Lire la suiteInterfirm Cooperation in Strategic Relationships: The Role of Formal Contract
Numéro: 2010-2 Interfirm Cooperation in Strategic Relationships: The Role of Formal Contract Jean Beuve (Chaire EPPP ) and Stéphane Saussier (Chaire EPPP) Abstract: In this paper, we use a large database of more than 3700 strategic relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by…
Lire la suiteThe Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts
Numéro: 2010-1 The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts Julie de Brux (Chaire EPPP & Vinci) Abstract: Renegotiations of public-private partnerships have recently been the subject of much attention. Economists regularly analyse them through the lens of ‘hold up’ theories. According to these models, renegotiations are a problem to be avoided:…
Lire la suiteContract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Axel GAUTIER (HEC-ULg and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain) & Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris 1 Sorbonne)
In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm by the mean of a fixed-term regulatory contract. This contract specifies the duties of the firm and a financial compensation. When it expires, a new contract is awarded, possibly to a different operator. There are three types of commonly used contracts: cost-plus, gross cost and net cost contracts. In this paper, we analyse the incentives for the operator to reduce its cost. These incentives come from both the profit maximization during the current contract and the perspective of contract renewal. In our model, the amount of cost-reducing effort depends on the contract type and the time remaining till contract expiration. We use a sample of 124 French urban public transport networks covering the period 1995-2002 to test our predictions. Our proxy for the cost reducing effort is technical efficiency. The data largely confirm the importance of contract type on performances and the incentive effect of contract renewal.
The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions
Numéro: 2009-7 The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions Laure Athias (IDHEAP/SPAN, Université de Lausanne) & Antonio Nunez (Laboratoire d’Economie des transports) Abstract: In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for toll road concession contracts. Such auctions are common-value auctions…
Lire la suitePartenariats public-privé et investissements de fin de contrat : le cas de l’industrie de l’eau en France
Numéro: 2009-6 Eshien CHONG (ADIS/GRJM, Université Paris 11) et Freddy HUET (GREDEG, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis) Résumé : L’efficacité des partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans les industries de service public en réseau a été remise en cause par de nombreux auteurs. Une des défaillances majeure reprochée à ce type d’accords concerne le manque d’incitation de l’opérateur en place à…
Lire la suiteAppels d’offres concurrentiels et avantage au sortant, une étude empirique du secteur du transport public urbain en France
Numéro: 2009-5 Appels d’offres concurrentiels et avantage au sortant, une étude empirique du secteur du transport pubic urbain en France Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris I Sorbonne) Résumé: Cet article porte sur les déterminants de la reconduction des contrats de services publics attribués par appels d’offres concurrentiels. Partant de la constatation que ces contrats changent très rarement…
Lire la suiteContract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Numéro: 2009-4 Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device – An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector Axel GAUTIER (HEC-ULg and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain) & Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris 1 Sorbonne) Abstract: In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm by the mean of a fixed-term…
Lire la suiteMake or Buy Urban Public Transport Services : A Rational Choice?
Numéro: 2009-3 Make or Buy Urban Public Transport Services: A Rational Choice? Miguel AMARAL & Anne YVRANDE-BILLON (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) Abstract: In this article, our aim is to study the determinants of the trade-off between in-house and outsourced utilities provision. More precisely, we focus on the French urban public transport sector. With regard to the issue…
Lire la suiteThe Rational of Plural Forms: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level
Numéro: 2009-2 Didier Chabaud – Thema, U. Cergy Pontoise, Arnaud Lavit d’Hautefort – Ytae, et Stéphane Saussier – Gregor, U. Paris 1 Abstract: In this article, we investigate the relative performances of companyowned outlets vs. franchised outlets using an original database consisting of 150 units of a French chain. At first glance, the financial and quality performances…
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