Revues and Books
Negotiated Procedures Overrated ? Evidence from France Questions the Commission’s Approach in the Latest Procurement Reforms
Abstract :
The new European legislative proposals on public procurement suggest introducing the unconditional possibility for public buyers to use negotiated procedures with publication. Such procedures have been available to French public buyers for contracts up to €5 million since 2004. We use an original and comprehensive database from Paris Habitat-OPH, the largest social housing constructor in Europe, to empirically assess the impact of negotiated procedures on price. After satisfyingly dealing with the endogeneity issue associated with the use of negotiated procedures, we find that such procedures significantly decreased the received bids by close to 26 % (the coefficient drops to 15.7% when excluding « abnormally » high offers). Some drivers of the positive effects we observe are highlighted, enabling us to derive practical implications of these results for public policies.
« The Dark And Bright Sides Of Renegotiation: An Application To Transport Concession Contracts »
Utilities Policy, 18 (2010), pp.77-85
Résumé: les renégociations des partenariats public-privé font l’objet d’une attention soutenue dans le cadre des théories des contrats. Nées de stratégies opportunistes, et visant à s’approprier des rentes, elles sont vues comme un écueil à éviter, puisqu’elles génèrent des pertes de surplus social. Même dans les cas où elles visent à mettre en place des investissements non contractualisables ex-ante, ces renégociations sont modélisées via un processus par lequel les parties maximisent leur surplus individuel de court-terme.
Cet article propose une vision alternative. Au travers de deux études de cas, nous montrons que les renégociations peuvent être coopératives. Ces études de cas suggèrent que lorsque les parties accordent de l’importance à leurs relations bilatérales présentes et futures, elles sont plus enclines à trouver des solutions soutenables et avantageuses pour toutes les parties au contrat. Même en agissant pour leur intérêt propre à l’étape de la renégociation, les parties cherchent à maximiser le surplus total. De cette façon, elles renforcent la pérennité de leurs relations.
« Performance and Risks in the Defense Procurement Sector »
Journal of Public Policy, 30(2), 1-19.
Abstract : Risks that emerge during the implementation and enforcement stages of defense procurement help explain procurement outcomes. Adverse events have impacts on the timing, cost and quality of goods supplied. The procurement process is analyzed on the basis of an original dataset covering 48 defense procurement contracts signed by the French Ministry of Defense with 18 European contractors. Contractual problems create the most adverse events in this sector, while technological risk is the second most significant risk. Although opportunism takes various forms, it is found only rarely in these defense contracts.
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« Contracting with Governments » Advances in Strategic Management, 26, 487-522
Eric Brousseau et Stéphane Saussier, 2009, « Contracting with Governments », Advances in Strategic Management, 26, 487-522
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